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THE NEW LEASED HOUSING PROGRAM:
HOW TENANTABLE A PROPOSITION?
Dear landlord, please don't dismiss my case,
I'm not about to argue,
I'm not about to move to no other place.
-Bob Dylan, Dear Landlord
To say -the very least, tenants of federally assisted housing are
caught in a most unenviable predicament. Because of their straitened
financial circumstances, they are unable to acquire decent shelter with-
out some form of substantial government support. As a result of this
dependency, they are unable to bargain over the terms and conditions
on which that support is offered. If a tenant objects to the manner
in which federal benefits are administered, he' is left with a simple
choice: he either withholds his complaint or returns to the private mar-
ket, where he must accept a substandard dwelling or sacrifice on such
necessities as food and clothing to obtain satisfactory accommodations.
Recognizing this plight, the courts, Congress, and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) have sought, in varying de-
grees, to remove major inequities from the operation of federal housing
programs by expanding tenants' rights to procedural due process.
Thus, tenants and applicants have recently attained the right to a hear-
ing when faced with eviction 2 or when denied admission 3 to an assisted
1. For the sake of convenience, the masculine pronoun includes the feminine.
2. Conventional public housing: e.g., Caulder v. Durham Housing Auth., 433
F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971); Escalera v. New York
City Housing Auth., 435 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970); U.S.
Dep't of Housing & Urban Development, Requirements and Recommendations to be Re-
flected in Tenant Dwelling Leases for Low-Rent Public Housing Projects, HUD Circular
RHM 7465.8, at 4 (Feb. 22, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Model Lease]; U.S. Dep't of
Housing & Urban Development, Grievance Procedure in Low-Rent Public Housing Proj-
ects, HUD Circular R-M 7465.9, at 2 (Feb. 22, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Model
Grievance Procedure]. Note that the Model Lease and Model Grievance Procedure are
currently being revised. See Proposed Dwelling Leases Procedures and Requirements,
39 Fed. Reg. 39285 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Dwelling Lease]; Proposed
Grievance Procedures and Requirements, 39 Fed. Reg. 39287 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Proposed Grievance Procedure].
Federally subsidized low-income housing: e.g., Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236
(4th Cir. 1973); Anderson v. Denny, 365 F. Supp 1254 (W.D. Va. 1973).
3. Housing & Community Development Act of 1974, § 201(a)6(c)(3), 42
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development. Moreover, administrators are forbidden to act in an arbi-
trary or discriminatory fashion.4
The programs to which these safeguards have been expressly ap-
plied are, however, being phased out of existence. The recent Hous-
ing and Community Development Act of 19741 does provide for the
continuation of "conventional" public housing, but only with reductions
in funding; 6 subsidies to privately-sponsored low-income developments
will be extended only until 1976.1 Under the new bill, efforts to rem-
U.S.C.A. § 1437d(c)(3) (Supp. 1975); Neddo v. Housing Auth., 335 F. Supp. 1397
(E.D. Wis. 1971); Davis v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Auth., 311 F. Supp. 795
(N.D. Ohio 1970) (conventional public housing).
4. E.g., Holmes v. New York City Housing Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968)
(conventional public housing); Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp.
134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (federally subsidized housing).
5. 88 Stat. 633 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 42 U.S.C.). Section
201 of Title II of the Housing & Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1437-37j (Supp. 1975), revises previous public housing legislation contained in the
United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-36 (1970), as amended (Supp.
III, 1973). These earlier statutes will continue to regulate the administration of low-
rent projects until the effective dates of the 1974 amendments.
Except for the provisions on the revised leased public housing program, the new
statutes will go into effect at such time as HUD prescribes, but not later than eighteen
months after August 22, 1974, the date of the legislation's enactment. Housing & Com-
munity Development Act of 1974, § 201(b), 88 Stat. 667. The revised leased housing
program went into effect on January 1, 1975. Id. Leases signed under the earlier pro-
gram, however, will not be affected by the new legislation. See id. § 208, 88 Stat. 669.
6. An additional $1.225 billion has been authorized for the support of both the
conventional and the leased public housing programs. Compare Housing & Community
Development Act of 1974, § 201(a)5(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437c(c) (Supp. 1975), with
Act of Oct. 2, 1973, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1410(e) (Supp. III, 1973). See also NATIONAL
HOUSING & EcONOMIc DEVELOPMENT LAW PROJECT, LAW PROJECT BULLETIN 15 n.50
(Oct. 15, 1974) [hereinafter cited as LAw PROJECT BULLETIN]. Only a small portion
of these funds will be directed toward developing conventional low-rent projects, how-
ever. HUD intends to channel most of the $964 million expected to be available for
new units into the revised leasing program. See id. at 15-17; J. HousING, Aug.-Sept.
1974, at 356. See also note 8 infra.
7. Sections 235 and 236 of the National Housing Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1715z, 1715z-1 (1970 & Supp. 1975), which concern federal mortgage subsidies on
homes and apartment developments for low and moderate income persons, have been
funded through June 30, 1976. Housing & Community Development Act of 1974, §§
211(a)(1), 212(6), 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1715z(h)(1), 1715z-l(n) (Supp. 1975). By con-
trast, all other FHA mortgage insurance programs have been extended until June 30,
1977. CoNFERENCE REPORT ON HOUSING & COMMUNrY DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1974,
H.R. REP. No. 93-1279, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1974) [hereinafter cited as CONFER-
ENCE REPORT]. Note also that while there are now sufficient appropriations under
section 236 to enable the construction of 79,000 low-rent apartment units, HUD intends
to release these funds only to those who demonstrate special housing needs which cannot
be met through the modified leasing program. See 2 HOusING & DEv. REP.-CRRENT
DEVELOPMENTS 333; CONFERENCE REPORT, supra, at 151. See also LAw PROJECT BUL-
LETIN, supra note 6, at 25-26, 41-42.
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edy the present shortage of decent, inexpensive units will instead be
concentrated in a single program-the leased housing program.
8
The leased housing approach is hardly an innovation. It first ap-
peared ten years ago when Congress added section 23 to the United
States Housing Act of 1937. 9 That amendment enabled local housing
authorities (LHAs)1° to rent privately owned dwellings and then to
sublet those units to eligible families at rates significantly below market
levels. The Housing and Community Development Act establishes a
program in general conformity with the original leasing idea, but it also
contains modifications that could disadvantage qualified households
with the lowest incomes-precisely the group in greatest need of fed-
eral support. Among the most important of these changes is the limi-
tation on a local authority's activity. Under the old program, the LHA
was itself a lessee; it negotiated its own rental agreements with land-
lords and typically was responsible for the management and repair of
units which it assigned to applicant families.11 Now, however, the ap-
plicant is expected to negotiate the lease himself, and the participating
owner must assume the burdens of managing and maintaining the
apartment. 12 The imposition of these duties will probably encourage
a private lessor to screen more carefully -any candidates whom he feels
may prove "undesirable." Moreover, a landlord may evict assisted ten-
ants, subject only to compliance with local law and the lease provis-
ions. 18 Previously, the LHA had much greater control over evictions
and was required to show good cause if it did choose to terminate a
tenancy."4 In general terms, therefore, the new legislation has sub-
stantially curtailed the circumstances and scope of the authority's partic-
ipation.
Critics of the amended program have argued that elimination of
8. Housing & Community Development Act of 1974 § 201(a) 8, 42 U.S.C.A. §
1437f (Supp. 1975). The Housing Assistance Payments Program, as the leased housing
program is also known, will receive most of the money available for new production.
It is estimated that $619 million will be allocated to the leasing program generally, while
an additional $150 million will be spent on the construction and rehabilitation of proj-
ects to be leased and owned by public housing agencies. These sums will assist 221,000
and 54,000 units respectively. J. HoUSING, Aug.-Sept. 1974 at 356. HUD has also sug-
gested that it may devote a further $150 million toward enabling public agencies to pur-
chase already existing units, which could then be incorporated into the leasing program.
However, there is some question as to whether this may legally be done. See LAw PROJ-
Er BuLLETIN, supra note 6, at 17.
9. Housing & Urban Development Act of 1965, § 103(a), 79 Stat. 455, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1421b (1970).
10. See note 22 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 80-82 infra.
12. See text accompanying notes 115-17 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 154-68 infra.
14. See notes 54-56 & accompanying text infra.
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the LHA as a buffer between the low-income family and the private
landlord creates a potential for discrimination and abuse.' 5 Given the
future importance of leased housing, that potential deserves to be
closely examined. To do so, this note will first summarize previous
and existing statutes on traditional as well as leased public housing pro-
grams; such an analysis should clarify the trends of federal policy and
provide a background for an application of current case law to the new
program. 6 Secondly, two areas of possible tenant-owner conflict-se-
lection and eviction of occupants-will be explored. Where problems
are identified, remedies available within the present statutory frame-
work will be suggested.
Statutory Framework of Conventional and Leased
Public Housing Programs
Conventional Public Housing
The public housing program, which originated in the United States
Housing Act of 1937,17 signaled the federal government's first major
effort to increase our nation's supply of low-rent dwelling units.' 8 The
act was directed specifically toward two objectives. The first was eco-
nomic: by stimulating the development of housing projects, Congress
hoped "to alleviate present and recurring unemployment"' 9 and to
strengthen the construction industry. The second goal was "to remedy
unsafe and insanitary conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe,
15. See, e.g., text accompanying note 144 infra.
16. Also applicable to the new leasing approach are several decisions involving the
subsidized low and moderate-income housing programs. Consequently, these programs
are briefly outlined as well. See note 99 infra.
17. Ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-36 (1970 & Supp. I,
1973). As has been mentioned in note 5 supra, § 201 of the Housing & Community
Development Act of 1974 completely revises public housing legislation. These new stat-
utes, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-37j, will be discussed primarily in footnotes. How-
ever, since the summary of the conventional program is provided chiefly as an introduc-
tion to the leasing method, the text in this particular section of the note concentrates
on the law as it existed prior to 1974.
18. The government did make a few abortive attempts to provide inexpensive
housing before 1937. These early efforts are described in PREsmENT's COMMrrrEE ON
URaN HousING, REPoRT, A DECENT HOME 54-56 (1968) [hereinafter cited as A DE-
CENT HoME]; H. REEvE, THE INFLUENCE OF THE METROPOLIS ON THE CONCEPTs, RULES
AND INSTITUTIONS RELATING TO PROPERTY 80-81 (1954); Riesenfield & Eastlund, Public
Aid to Housing and Land Redevelopment, 34 MINN. L. REv. 610 (1950).
19. United States Housing Act of 1937, § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970). See gen-
erally Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 642,
646 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Friedman]. The equivalent, superseding provision in
the Housing & Community Development Act of 1974 contains no language concerning
unemployment. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437 (Supp. 1975).
[Vol. 26
LEASED HOUSING PROGRAM
and sanitary dwellings for families of low income .... . It was not
then expected, however, that assistance would go to households with
extremely low incomes; rather, the program was targeted for the "de-
serving poor," the blue-collar families which had been hard hit by the
Depression.2
Although public housing has undergone numerous changes during
the last few decades, its basic structure has been little altered: put
simply, the federal government provides financial support for the pro-
duction of housing which is planned and operated by LHAs22 or similar
23agencies. The development process is begun when the local body
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970). Compare Housing & Community Development Act
of 1974, § 201(a)2, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437 (Supp. 1975). State enabling statutes for local
housing authorities contain similar language. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 34201
(West 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 157-2 (1972).
21. More specifically, the program was intended to reach households with incomes
in the $600-1000 range. See H.R. REP. No. 1545, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1937).
Note also the following remarks of Senator Wagner, sponsor of the public housing bill:
' There are some people whom we cannot possibly reach; I mean those who have no
means to pay the rent minus the subsidy." 81 CONG. RWc. 8099 (1937). See also notes
49-61 & accompanying text infra.
22. Housing authorities are public corporations established and operated in ac-
cordance with local laws. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 34203 (West 1973). The
requisite enabling legislation now exists in all 50 States and has been uniformly upheld
as a valid exercise of the States' police powers. E.g., Housing Auth. v. Dockweiler, 14
Cal. 2d 437, 94 P.2d 794 (1939). See also the statutes and cases in HousiNG & Dayv.
REP.REFRENCE FrLE 160:0101-47 (1973), Such legislation typically empowers local
governments with the discretion to organize a housing authority by passing an appropri-
ate resolution. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 34242-44 (West 1973). Most authori-
ties are directed by a board of commissioners (which usually may include tenants) ap-
pointed by the local governing body or its presiding officer. E.g., id. §§ 34270-72.
While a housing authority's operation is commonly limited to the boundaries of its
founding political jurisdiction, it frequently functions as an independent entity. Housing
Auth. v. City of Los Angeles, 38 Cal. 2d 853, 243 P.2d 515, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836
(1952). There are also several statewide authorities. See generally HousIxrN & DEv.
REP. -Rm7EEENc FiLFE 50:0011-2108 (1973).
The enabling statutes are the source and measure of an authority's powers and ob-
ligations. The powers granted are usually all those necessary and appropriate to provide
low-income dwellings and to clear slums, such as the power to lease, sell and construct
housing, the power to sell bonds and to contract with the federal government for finan-
cial assistance, and the power of eminent domain. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE, §§
34310, 34312, 34315 (West 1973). See generally 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§ 699 (1949).
23. To obtain federal assistance for a low-rent project, an applicant must qualify
as a "public housing agency" (PHA), defined as "any State, county, municipality, or
other governmental entity or public body (or agency or instrumentality thereof) which
is authorized to engage in or assist in the development or operation of low-income hous-
ing." Housing & Community Development Act of 1974, § 201(a) 3(6), 42 U.S.C.A. §
1437a(6) (Supp. 1975). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1402(11) (1970). Note that 1974 leg-
islation expanded this definition to encompass state housing finance agencies which pro-
vided funds for, but do not actually participate in, low-rent housing construction. For
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submits its initial proposal to HUD for review. If the project is found
acceptable, HUD will make a preliminary loan to the LHA for site op-
tions, surveys, and plan preparation.24 The final proposal must also
be given HUD's approval, after which HUD will execute an annual con-
tributions contract (ACC) with the local authority. The ACC contains
the federal government's guarantee that it will satisfy the yearly pay-
ments of principal and interest on financing obtained by the authority
for housing construction. 5 The ACC also imposes certain conditions
to be met by LHAs in developing and administering their projects.26
The above procedures involve local governments as well. HUD
is not permitted to make loan agreements and ACCs unless they have
been formally approved by the governing body of the community in
which the project is to be built.2 Furthermore, federal aid is restricted
to housing which is exempt from state and local taxes, although author-
ities may be required to make in lieu payments of up to one-tenth of
their rent receipts if local jurisdictions so desire.
28
a description of the functions of state finance agencies see HOUSING & DEv.-REF-
ERENCE FILE 50:0011-2108 (1973).
The decision to give local agencies the primary responsibility for project develop-
ment and construction was prompted by the courts. During the early 1930's, the federal
government itself attempted to produce low-rent units and to clear slums. See note 18
supra. However, the courts ruled that the government's condemnation of private prop-
erty for these purposes was unconstitutional. United States v. Certain Lands, 78 F.2d
684 (6th Cir. 1935) (public housing and slum clearance not within federal government's
eminent domain powers). By contrast, it was held that authorized state bodies could
condemn land for low-rent housing construction. E.g., New York City Housing Auth.
v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936). See generally H. REEvE, THE INFLu-
ENCE OF THE METROPOLIS ON THE CONCEPTS, RULES AND INSTITUTIONS RELATING TO
PROPERTY 81-85 (1954).
24. NATIONAL HOUSING & ECONOMIC DEVELOPNMNT LAW PROJEcT, 1 HANDBOOK
ON HOUSING LAW: Guin TO FEDERAL HOUSING, REDEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING PRO-
GRAMS ch. IV, pt. I, at 6 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HOUSING LAw HANDBOOK].
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1410(a), (c) (1970). Compare Housing & Community Devel-
opment Act of 1974, §§ 5(a), (c), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1437c(a), (c) (Supp. 1975). ACCs
for conventional public housing could originally extend over a 60 year period, but their
maximum term was later limited to 40 years. Id. As to the availability of funds for
operating costs which cannot be paid from rent receipts, see notes 58, 61 infra.
26. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g) (1970). Compare Housing & Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974, § 6(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(c) (Supp. 1975).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7) (1970), as amended (Supp. m, 1973). Compare Hous-
ing & Community Development Act of 1974, § 201(a)5(e), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437c(e)
(Supp. 1975). Note that prior to 1974 the governing body was also required to elim-
inate substandard units in a number substantially equal to those provided in the new
project. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(a) (1970). This "equivalent elimination" provision was de-
signed to maintain the balance of supply and demand and to prevent government compe-
tition with private enterprise. Friedman, supra note 19, at 647.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(h) (1970). Compare Housing & Community Development
Act of 1974, § 201(a)6(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(d) (Supp. 1975). Since the payment
in lieu of taxes (PILOT) generally equals only one-third the amount normally due, the
1150 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26
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When these conditions are satisfied and an ACC is signed, the
LHA may arrange for public bidding on the construction contract and
select a builder. Finally, once the units are satisfactorily completed, 9
the authority will 'admit tenants and assume ongoing administrative du-
ties.
Beyond setting forth the financial structure of public housing,
Congress has enacted provisions directed toward the operation and
management of low-rent projects. Under the United States Housing
Act, program eligibility is limited to "families of low-income.
3 0
Besides its obvious connotations, "family" is statutorily defined to in-
elude single persons who are either elderly, handicapped, or disabled;3'
have been displaced by government action or natural disaster;32 or rep-
resent the remaining member of a tenant household.33 With regard
to the second requirement, that of "low-income," qualified applicants
are broadly termed 'as those "who cannot afford to pay enough to cause
private enterprise in their locality or metropolitan area to build an ade-
quate supply of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for their use."
3 4
Specific meaning is given to this language by the LHAs, which are em-
powered to set maximum income limits for occupancy of housing proj-
ects.3 To be eligible, families must have incomes below the author-
ity's ceiling, but HUD has suggested that incomes be calculated in light
tax exemption actually provides a second, nonfederal subsidy to conventional public
housing. Weinstein, Housing Subsidies: An Overview, 51 J. URBAN L. 723, 733 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Weinstein].
29. The LHA issues a memorandum of acceptance for occupancy when the project
is finished. The memorandum, which must be approved by HUD, relieves the contrac-
tor from further obligations except as stated within the document. HOUSING & DEv.
REP.-RE FERENCE FLE 30:0013 (1973).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1970). Compare Housing & Community Development
Act of 1974, § 201(a)3(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(1) (Supp. 1975). Note that prior
to 1974, public housing was to be available solely for families of low income. This lan-
guage has been omitted in the recent amendment. See the discussion of related
amendments in notes 38-39 infra.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(2) (1970). Compare Housing & Community Development
Act of 1974, § 201(a)3(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(2) (Supp. 1975). Such individuals
qualify as "elderly families," a term which now also includes an aged, handicapped or
disabled person and a live-in caretaker. Note that the definition of "handicapped" has
been broadened as well.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(2) (1970). Compare Housing & Community Development
Act of 1974, § 201(a)3(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(2) (Supp. 1975).
33. See note 32 supra.
34. See note 32 supra.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1970). Compare Housing & Community Development
Act of 1974, § 201(a)3(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(1) (Supp. 1975). Note that these
income limits must receive HUD's approval. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g) (1) (1970).
Compare Housing & Community Development Act of 1974, § 201(a)6(c)(1), 42
U.S.C.A. § 1437d(c) (1) (Supp. 1975).
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of reasonable deductions and exemptions. 6 In the past, LHAs were
required to evict resident families with incomes above separate, usually
higher, "continued occupancy" levels.17 That restriction does not ap-
pear, however, in the Housing and Community Development Act of
1974.88
Also until the recent legislation, local authorities were required
to establish admission policies which acknowledged their responsibility
for rehousing displacees and which gave full consideration to an ap-
plicant's age, disability, and present living conditions and to the urgency
of his housing need. 39  In practice these rules were frequently applied
36. HousING LAw HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ch. IV, pt. V, at 8.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g) (3) (1970). Note that over-income families were not to
be evicted if the LHA determined that they could not reasonably afford decent housing
in the private market.
38. Consequently, any family which is properly admitted may remain in its unit
regardless of the size of subsequent income increases. This is, of course, to such a fam-
ily's advantage; it has both the option of moving into perhaps more comfortable private
housing and the security which only a tenancy in government-assisted housing can af-
ford. Allowing the relatively more prosperous tenants to remain is also beneficial to
the LHA from a financial standpoint. As incomes rise, so do rent receipts (see text
accompanying note 47 infra); and sufficiently large rent receipts not only facilitate the
payment of administrative costs and the build-up of a reserve fund, but they also assure
the LHA's qualification for operation subsidies. See note 61 infra. On the other hand,
permitting higher-income tenants to remain in public housing is arguably not in the best
interests of the truly poor who have applied for assistance and must await the opening
of a vacancy. (Public housing waiting lists have long been interminable. In 1966, it
was estimated that in America's 50 largest cities there was an average ratio of 28 eligi-
ble applicants for each vacant public housing unit. NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN
PROBLEMS, BurLDING THE AMERICAN CrrY 131 (1968) (Table 12). There is no reason
to suppose that the ratio has improved during the past nine years.) Most of these fami-
lies occupy depressing, unhealthy and often dangerous housing; their living conditions
desperately need improvement. The removal of over-income as grounds for eviction will
not, however, accelerate turnover in the low-rent projects.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g)(3) (1970), construed in Fletcher v. Housing Auth., 491
F.2d 793 (6th Cir.) (selection policies based on incomes of eligible applicants held in-
valid), vacated mem., 95 S. Ct. 27 (1974) (remanded for consideration in light of Hous-
ing & Community Development Act of 1974.). The Housing & Community Develop-
ment Act contains a provision which reflects a very different policy toward tenants
whose circumstances have improved. In brief, the new language requires adherence to
"tenant selection criteria designed to assure that, within a reasonable period of time, the
project will include families with a broad range of incomes and will avoid concentra-
tions of low-income and deprived families with serious social problems . . . ." §
201 (a) 6(c) (4) (A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(c) (4) (A) (Supp. 1975). Whatever its merit
as a matter of policy, this amendment is a clear departure from the belief that low-rent
housing should be given to those who need it most. Instead, it reflects a preference for
"economic mix," evidenced by the deletion of over-income as grounds for eviction (note
38 supra), and for fiscal stability (notes 45, 47, 61 infra). See S. REP. No. 93-693,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40, 41 (1974).
However, another amendment requires that "[a]t least 20 per centum of the dwell-
ing units in any project placed under annual contributions contracts . . . after the effec-
[Vol. 26
LEASED HOUSING PROGRAM
to control the order in which already eligible families would be ranked
on the waiting list.40  When a family is selected for housing, the author-
ity must certify to HUD that the tenant was properly admitted in ac-
cordance with the appropriate regulations and income standards.41
Applicants who are refused admission must, under a'1969 amendment,
be notified of their ineligibility and must be allowed to discuss the de-
nial at an informal hearing.42
In addition, tenants are afforded certain protection against exces-
sive rents. Congress defines conventional public housing as "decent,
safe, and sanitary dwellings within the financial reach of families of low
income. . . -43 LHAs are authorized to set rent levels on their proj-
ect units, but, consistent with the definition above, the maximum per-
missible charge has been limited by what are popularly known as the
Brooke Amendments, passed in 1969, 1970, and 1971. 44 These meas-
ures forbid a local authority from charging a rent which exceeds one-
fourth of a tenant's monthly income,4 5 as adjusted to include statutory
tive date of this section shall be occupied by very low-income families." Housing &
Community Development Act of 1974, § 201(a)3(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(1) (Supp.
1975). This requirement may benefit the poor who seek units from LHAs which previ-
ously favored applicants with the highest eligible incomes; but it will provide no visible
benefits when applied to the authorities which have consistently assigned more than one-
fifth of their units to the poor. The definition of "very low-income families" should
also be noted. Such families are those "whose incomes do not exceed 50 per centum of
the median family income for the area." Id. § 201(a)3(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(2)
(Supp. 1975). However, 507o of the national median income, approximately $5,560,
is $1000 above the poverty level. 120 CoNG. RPc. 5404 (1974) (remarks of Congress-
man Stokes). Half the national median income is, moreover, roughly twice the average
income of the present public housing tenants. Id. at 5400 (1974) (remarks of Congress-
woman Schroeder). See also LAw PRoJECr BULLETIN, supra note 6, at 5-7.
40. See Fletcher v. Housing Auth., 491 F.2d 793 (6th Cir.), vacated mem., 95 S.
Ct. 27 (1974) (remanded for consideration in light of statutory amendment).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g)(3) (1970). Compare Housing & Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974, § 201(a)6(c) (2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(c) (2) (Supp. 1975).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g) (4) (1970). Compare Housing & Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974, § 201(a)6(c) (3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(c) (3) (Supp. 1975).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1970), as amended (Supp. I1, 1973). Compare Hous-
ing & Community Development Act of 1974, § 201(a)3(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(1)
(Supp. 1975).
44. Housing & Urban Development Act of 1971, § 9, 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1)
(1970), as amended (Supp. HII, 1973) (also known as Brooke i); Housing & Urban
Development Act of 1970, § 208(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1970), as amended (Supp.
MI, 1973) (also known as Brooke II); Housing & Urban Development Act of 1969, §
213(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1970), as amended (Supp. I1, 1973) (also known as
Brooke I). Compare Housing & Community Development Act of 1974, § 201 (a)3(1),
42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(1) (Supp. 1975).
45. Housing & Urban Development Act of 1969, § 213(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1)
(1970) (Brooke I). Compare Housing & Community Development Act of 1974, § 201
(a)3(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(1) (Supp. 1975). Although the 1974 amendments retain
the statutory maximum rent limit, they also establish a minimum payment, set at the
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deductions and exemptions.46 Tenant incomes must also be period-
ically reexamined, and rental obligations realigned in conformity with
any change in financial circumstances.47
Aside from the statutory provisions on rents and eligibility, how-
ever, local housing authorities have traditionally been granted "the
maximum amount of responsibility in the administration of the low-rent
housing programs. '48  LHAs have fully exercised this mandate, but in
recent years many of the authorities' practices have been strongly op-
posed by the poor. The conflict stems largely from a change in the
class of persons who reside in and apply for public housing. After
World War II, the "submerged middle class," which originally occupied
the low-rent units, began to prosper and moved into the private market.
In its place appeared the "permanent poor," many of whom were af-
flicted with social problems beyond mere financial distress. 49  It was
higher of 5% of a tenant's gross income or his welfare housing allowance. Id. This
requirement consequently repeals Brooke IH, which forbade any decrease in a tenant's
welfare payments attributable to a rent reduction arising from Brooke I. Housing & Ur-
ban Development Act of 1971, § 9, 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1970), as amended (Supp.
I1, 1973). While the new welfare provision will have limited application, some doubt
has been expressed as to its constitutionality. See LAw PROJECr BULLE TN, supra note
6, at 8-9. See also Hammond v. Housing Auth., 328 F. Supp. 586 (D. Ore. 1971)
(higher rents for welfare recipients held violative of equal protection); Note, Higher
Rents for Welfare Recipients in Public Housing: An Analysis Under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 263 (1972).
The minimum rent language demonstrates a renewed congressional concern for the
fiscal integrity of low-rent projects. This attitude underlies many other 1974 amend-
ments. See notes 47, 62 infra.
46. Housing & Urban Development Act of 1970, § 208(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1)
(1970), as amended (Supp. HI, 1973). Compare Housing & Community Development
Act of 1974, § 201(a)3(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(1) (Supp. 1975). The 1974 legisla-
tion redefines income to prevent the possibility of double deductions by secondary earn-
ers who are also dependents.
47. Housing & Community Development Act of 1974, § 201(a)6(c)(2), 42
U.S.C.A. § 1437d(c) (2) (Supp. 1975). The 1974 enactment also requires LHAs to fol-
low "procedures designed to assure the prompt payment and collection of rents and the
prompt processing of eviction in the case of nonpayment of rent." Id. § 201 (a)6(c) (4)
(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(c) (4) (B) (Supp. 1975). This is the first time Congress has
spoken on rent collection practices. See also LAw PROJECT BULLETIN, supra note 6, at
13-14. The language reinforces the notion expressed elsewhere in the act (see notes
45 supra & 62 infra) that projects must be managed in a financially responsible manner.
Note also that the elimination of over-income as grounds for termination (see note 38
supra) and the provision of eviction for nonpayment of rent are equivalent statements
of the congressional attitude toward the economics of low-rent housing.
48. Housing Act of 1959, § 501, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970) ("local autonomy
amendment"), construed in Housing Auth. v. United States Housing Auth., 468 F.2d 1,
5-8 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927 (1973). Compare Housing & Commun-
ity Development Act of 1974, § 201 (a)2, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437 (Supp. 1975), which em-
ploys more qualified language.
49. See Friedman, supra note 19, at 651-52. For a discussion of the post-war leg-
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at this time that local authorities began to develop admission and evic-
tion standards designed to maintain project respectability and to ex-
clude potentially troublesome families.5" Such standards have usually
relied on subjective assessments of a tenant's social desirability and so
have most harshly affected those persons with extremely low incomes
or "questionable" backgrounds. 51
Increasingly the courts have recognized, however, both the help-
lessness of tenants and applicants in dealing with this problem and the
fact that public housing should be open to those with the greatest need.
Consequently, they have become more inclined to limit or even to pro-
hibit the use of certain desirability criteria.52 HUD, as the ultimate su-
pervisor of public housing, has also sought to prevent abuses by issuing
regulations and strengthening management conditions in its ACCs.
53
For example, it has stated that applicants may not be denied admission
or tenants be evicted unless they have engaged in, or threaten to
engage in, conduct "likely to interfere with other tenants [so] as to
islative emphasis on opening low-rent projects to the truly poor, see Fletcher v. Housing
Auth., 491 F.2d 793, 803-04 (6th Cir.), vacated mem., 95 S. Ct. 27 (1974) (remanded
for consideration in light of statutory amendment).
50. See Friedman, supra note 19, at 655, 657-59.
51. See J. RosE, LANDLORDS AND TENANTs §§ 8.38-.43 (1973); Note, Nonfinancial
Eligibility and Eviction Standards in Public Housing-The Problem Family in the Great
Society, 53 CORNELL L. Rav. 1122 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Nonfinancial Eilgibility
and Eviction Standards]; Note, Public Landlords and Private Tenants: The Eviction of
"Undesirables" from Public Housing Projects, 77 YALE L.J. 988 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Public Landlords and Private Tenants]. Until recently, public housing leases
were notoriously unfavorable to the tenant; they contained an inordinate number of re-
strictions, often phrased in vague and baffling legalese. Nonfinancial Eligibility and
Eviction Standards, supra, at 1133 & n.81; Public Landlords and Private Tenants, supra,
at 989 n.9. HUD has done much to outlaw, if not eliminate, many of these unfair stand-
ards and practices. See Model Lease, supra note 2; Model Grievance Procedure, supra
note 2. See note 55 infra.
52. E.g., Cole v. Housing Auth., 312 F. Supp. 692 (D.R.L), aff'd, 435 F.2d 807
(1st Cir. 1970) (two-year residency requirement for public housing held invalid); Colon
v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (quota for wel-
fare recipients in subsidized housing held a denial of equal protection); Thomas v. Hous-
ing Auth., 282 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (blanket exclusion of unwed mothers vio-
lated Fourteenth Amendment); cf. Tucker v. Norwalk Housing Auth., No. B-251 (D.
Conn. May 24, 1971), summarized in 1 CCH Pov. L. REP. q 2735.13 (preliminary in-
junction against enforcement of vague admissions standards). Compare earlier decisions
finding that housing authorities had the same right to evict as private landlords, cited
in note 178 infra.
53. For example, section 203 of the Annual Contributions Contract (Part H)
contains the following restrictions: "The Local Authority shall not permit any family
to occupy a dwelling in any Project except pursuant to a written lease... which lease
shall provide that the Local Authority shall not terminate the tenancy other than for
violation of the terms of the lease or other good cause," quoted in Brown v. Housing
Auth., 471 F.2d 63, 66 (7th Cir. 1972).
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materialy diminish their enjoyment of the premises. 54  More impor-
tantly, HUD has also issued lease and grievance procedure requirements
which safeguard families from discriminatory action by authority of-
ficials.5 5  The grievance procedure, for example, enables a tenant to
demand a hearing on "any LHA action or failure to act involving LHA
54. U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Development, HUD Circular 12-17-68 § 2c,
quoted in Tyson v. New York City Housing Auth., 369 F. Supp. 513, 521 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). Concerning HUD's power to impose such requirements on local authorities, see
note 55 infra.
55. Proposed Dwelling Lease, supra note 2; Proposed Grievance Procedure, supra
note 2. The proposed regulations suggest certain amendments to the regulations con-
tained in earlier HUD circulars which have been in effect since 1973. Compare Pro-
posed Dwelling Lease, supra, and Proposed Grievance Procedure, supra, with Model
Lease, supra note 2, and Model Grievance Procedure, supra note 2. In addition to vari-
ous recommendations, the Model Lease contains several provisions that LHA rental
agreements are required to incorporate. Among these are statements limiting evictions
to those made only for good cause, providing for a written 30 day notice to vacate, and
permitting tenants of hazardous units to withhold rent in some situations. The Model
Grievance Procedure affords tenants the right to be heard on any matters concerning
their leases or on LHA conduct adversely affecting them. Several procedural require-
ments, attendant on the hearing and designed to assure due process, are set forth as well.
See text accompanying notes 148-50 infra.
The Proposed Dwelling Lease and the Proposed Grievance Procedure largely restate
their predecessors, but a few important changes have also been indicated. For one thing,
an administrative hearing is no longer demanded of LHAs in eviction cases concerning
nonpayment of rent (or other charges) if a due process trial on the merits will be pro-
vided by the local courts. Proposed Grievance Procedure, supra note 2, at 39288.
Moreover, where the complaint involves nonpayment of rent or other charges (such as
those for utilities, services, repairs, etc.), the tenant must place the disputed sum in an
escrow account pending the hearing. Id. The proposed rules do not suggest, as does
the Model Grievance Procedure, that an LHA may extend the hearing process to appli-
cants, and they expressly deny its availability where class grievances are involved (e.g.,
rent strikes). Id.
Prior to 1974, HUD's authority to require that local agencies comply with its cir-
culars (such as the Model Lease) stemmed from § 8 of the United States Housing Act
of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1408 (1970). That section empowered HUD to "make, amend,
and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
of this chapter," and, in Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268 (1969), such language
was held sufficient to validate a circular which required LHAs to afford an informal
hearing to tenants they sought to evict. Although the Model Lease and the Model
Grievance Procedure imposed greater burdens on local authorities, these circulars have
been sustained as well. Brown v. Housing Auth., 471 F.2d 63 (7th Cir. 1972); Housing
Auth. v. United States Housing Auth., 468 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 927 (1973). 1974 revisions to the United States Housing Act do not, however,
include anything which directly corresponds to the original § 8. As authority for its
Proposed Dwelling Lease and Grievance Procedures, HUD has instead recited 42 U.S.C.
§ 3535(d) (1970) and § 201 of the Housing & Community Development Act of 1974,
42 U.S.C.A. § 1437-37j (Supp. 1975) (revising the entire United States Housing Act
of 1937). Proposed Dwelling Lease, supra, at 39285; Proposed Grievance Procedure,
supra, at 39288. See also Housing & Community Development Act of 1974, §§ 201 (a)6
(c) (4) (B), (C), 42 U.S.C.A. H9 1437d(c) (4) (B), (C) (Supp. 1975).
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regulations, policies or procedures which adversely affect his rights, du-
ties, welfare or status."56
The change in tenant population contributed to disputes over rent
schedules as well. While project operating costs began to increase dur-
ing the late 1960's, there was no corresponding increase in tenant in-
comes.5 7  To meet their higher expenses, housing authorities turned
to the reserves they had built up in previous years and applied for spe-
cial subsidies established by Congress.58  When these measures failed
to produce the necessary funds, LHAs were forced to increase rents
as a means of remaining solvent.5 9 Not surprisingly, this action was
vigorously protested by the tenants, many of whom found themselves
paying almost half their incomes toward rent.60 Congress enacted the
Brooke Amendments 61 to alleviate these difficulties and authorized HUD
to contribute sums for management costs as well as for project financ-
ing°
2
56. Proposed Grievance Procedure, supra note 2, at 39288.
57. See generally F. DE LEEJW, OPmrNG Cos's IN PUBLIC Housm--A FINAN-
crAL Caisis (1970), in Hearings on Housing & Urban Development Legislation of 1970
Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Banking and Cur-
rency Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1063-1128 (1970). In mid-1969, former HUD
Secretary Romney stated that 15 major housing authorities were "on the verge of bank-
ruptcy," with an additional two hundred in serious financial difficulty. N.Y. Times, Oct.
12, 1969, at 1, col. 5.
58. In 1961, an allowance of up to $120 per elderly family was authorized to en-
able LHAs to house the aged at an affordable rent and yet also operate on a solvent
basis. Housing Act of 1961, § 203, 42 U.S.C. § 1410(a) (1970). This subsidy was
extended to displaced families, large families and families of "unusually low income" in
1964 and 1968. Housing Act of 1964, § 402, 42 U.S.C. § 1410(a) (1970); Housing
& Urban Development Act of 1968, § 209(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1410(a) (1970). Until
1969, when Congress permitted ACCs to include operational as well as financing costs,
these special subsidies were a local authority's primary means of covering expenses not
payable from rent receipts. The allowances were deleted in the 1974 amendments, how-
ever, and in their stead a separate, all-inclusive operational subsidy has been established.
See note 62 infra.
59. Cf. letter from Lawrence H. Cox, HUD Assistant Secretary for Housing and
Assistance, to Reginald L. Brignac, NAHRO Housing Divisional Comm., May 26, 1969,
quoted in P. MART N, Tim ILL-HouSED, CASES AND MATERUALS ON TENANTS' RIGHTS IN
PRIVATE AND PuBLIC HousiNG, 1267 n.71 (1971). For an example of one local author-
ity's attempt to meet financial problems by raising rents, see Thompson v. Washington,
497 F.2d 626, 629-30 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
60. See, e.g., Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626, 630-31 n.20 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
61. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
62. To meet already existing deficits in LHA budgets, and to compensate for the
expected financial impact of the Brooke Amendments, Congress passed legislation which
modified the ACC to include contributions for the payment of otherwise unsatisfied ad-
ministrative costs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1410(a), (b) (1970), as amended (Supp. I1, 1973).
See also Fletcher v. Housing Auth., 491 F.2d 793, 803-04 (6th Cir.), vacated mem., 95
S. Ct. 27 (1974) (remanded for consideration in light of statutory amendment). Con-
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Section 23 Leased Public Housing
During the last twenty years, conventional public housing has been
the target of substantial criticism. Along with the conflicts over man-
agement policies, there have been repeated attacks on the design and
appearance of low-rent developments and on the lack of sufficient
amenities and security.6 3  Moreover, local governments have been un-
willing to accept public housing projects, particularly when construction
is proposed for neighborhoods that are predominantly white and middle
class.6" Partly in response to these problems, Congress established a
leasing program in the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965.65
The leasing program also known as section 23, was intended to
supplement the more traditional public housing approach.66  Participa-
ting LHAs were expected to undertake "an affirmative, orderly pro-
gram" designed to utilize existing private accommodations that were,
gress also appropriated additional funds to be used solely for operational expenses.
However, the funds appropriated were insufficient to eliminate the crisis and, to make
matters worse, the Office of Management and Budget temporarily impounded the money.
See Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Nahro v. Lynn,
Civil No. 2080-72 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 1974), summarized in 2 CCH Pov. L. RuP. 119,937.
The Housing & Community Development Act of 1974 again restricts the ACC to
payment of the principal and debt service on an authority's financing. § 201(a)5(a),
42 U.S.C.A. § 1437c(a) (Supp. 1975). However the act also provides a separately au-
thorized operational subsidy. § 201(a)9, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437g (Supp. 1975). To
qualify for this subsidy, LHAs must have aggregate rentals of at least one-fifth the sum
of the incomes of all the tenants. This requirement will deter an authority from accept-
ing a large proportion of welfare recipients, and in that respect is consistent with the
new emphasis an "economic mix." See notes 38-39 supra. Furthermore, the restriction
will encourage LHAs to establish higher rent levels, a result consistent also with congres-
sional emphasis on fiscal integrity. See notes 45-47 supra.
63. See generally Friedman, supra note 19, at 643-45.
64. Public housing site location and suburban exclusionary practices have become
much litigated issues. E.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 503 F.2d 530 (7th
Cir. 1974); Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Auth., 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1975); Lawrence v. Oakes, 361
F. Supp. 432 (D. Vt. 1973); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), affd
in part mem., 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973).
The construction of conventional low-rent units outside the urban core has proved
especially difficult in California. Article XXXIV of the California Constitution pro-
hibits the development, construction or acquisition of a public housing project by any
state or public body unless the project is approved by a majority of the voters of the
locality for which the project is proposed. Article XXXIV was held not to deny equal
protection of the laws in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (5-3 decision, Doug-
las, J., not participating).
65. § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1421b (1970) (added § 23 to the United States Housing
Act of 1937). A brief account of the leasing program's fairly uneventful legislative
birth is contained in Friedman & Krier, A New Lease on Life: Section 23 Housing
and the Poor, 116 U. PA. L REV. 611, 614-16 (1968) [herinafter cited as Friedman &
Krier].
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1421b(a)(1) (1970).
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or could be made, suitable for tenancy by eligible families.0 7 To obtain
funds, an authority was required to present HUD with a project applica-
tion describing both the availability of acceptable vacant units within
its jurisdiction and the local need for housing assistance.6 8  Addition-
ally, the LHA had to demonstrate that, given the incomes and rent pay-
ing capacity of anticipated applicants, the program would be financially
feasible when supported by federal contributions. 69  HUD assistance
to leased housing was, however, limited to that amount which would
be necessary for comparable new construction under the conventional
program.70  If the LHA proposal was found to be feasible despite this
restriction, 71 the authority and HUD would execute an ACC, in which
the government promised to provide financial support for a stated num-
ber of years.
72
Following execution of the ACC, the local authority would then
begin a continuing survey and listing of units which would be appropri-
ate for program use.7 3  The LHA was also.required to advertise pe-
riodically its need for housing within the chosen community. 74 Dwell-
ings offered by private owners would then be inspected to determine
whether they qualified as "decent, safe, and sanitary"; if so, a market
rental would be negotiated within a range which, when reduced by the
HUD subsidy, eligible tenants could afford.75 Section 23 required that
67. H.R. REP. No. 365, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1965);.
68. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, No. RHA 7430.1 Low-
RENT HousiNG: LEAsED HOUSING HANDBOOK ch. 2, § 1, at 1 (Nov. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as SECTION 23 HANDBOOK].
69. Id. at 1-2.
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1421b(a)(1), (e) (1970). The maximum permissible annual
contribution was derived by means of the "flexible formula." Basically, this formula
involved: (1) calculating the development cost of a newly constructed project contain-
ing the number and types of units for which the leasing proposal was made: and (2)
multiplying the development cost by the interest rates achieved on 40 year bonds sold
by local authorities. SECTION 23 HANDBOOK, supra note 68, ch. 2, § 2.
71. Feasibility was determined by subtracting the fixed annual contribution (ob-
tained through application of the flexible formula) from the proposed project's estimated
total costs (rents to be charged by participating owners and operating expenses). The
remainder would indicate the average rent which the LHA needed to charge its tenant
in order to sustain a solvent operation. The project's feasibility depended upon whether
these rents could be afforded by the anticipated low income families. SECTION 23 HAND-
BOOK, supra note 68, ch. 2, § 1, at 1-2.
72. When § 23 was originally enacted, the maximum term of an ACC for a leas-
ing project was three years. In 1970, this term was extended to 10 years, provided that
the total period of assistance, including ACC renewals, did not exceed 15 years in the
case of existing housing programs and 20 years in the case of newly constructed housing
programs. 42 U.S.C. § 1421b(d) (1970).
73. Id. § 1421b(b) (1970).
74. Id. § 1421b(c).
75. Id. Note that the costs of these and other necessary administrative activities
were reimbursable by HUD through the ACC. Id. § 1421b(e).
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only 10 percent of the units in any structure be placed under assistance,
but, paradoxically, it further stated that LHAs could waive this limita-
tion for any reason.76 Since most authorities exercised their preroga-
tive, the distribution quota had little practical effect.
77
Although leases were usually obtained through the authority's own
efforts, the program also permitted eligible families occupying accept-
able units to seek assistance on their current rental obligations. 78  Fur-
thermore, applicants could, if they wished, locate dwellings on their
own and have them placed under section 23 by the LHA. The "find-
ers-keepers" policy, as it has been called, enabled households which did
locate a suitable vacancy to move in immediately and thereby to avoid
the authority's waiting list.
79
The contractual arrangements necessary to subsidize the leased
housing allowed for similar flexibility." Under one approach, the
LHA and the low-income tenant could pay their respective shares (as
determined by the LHA) of the market rent to the owner; such a method
was appropriate where the family was already living in the unit and
had signed its own lease. More frequently, however, the authority
would execute its own contract with a landlord and pay him the com-
plete rent; it would then sublet to an applicant and collect his smaller
payment separately.8' Under the latter method, the LHA typically as-
sumed responsibility for management and repair, 2 although it was pos-
76. Id. § 1421b(c). Note, however, the following HUD provision: "While the
legislation authorized the local agency itself to waive this instruction, the social value
in adhering to it is so great that any waiver should be in accordance with policies estab-
lished by the Local Authority Board and adequately considered at a high management
level. Reasons for the waiver shall be documented." SECTION 23 HANDBOOK, supra note
68, ch. 1, § 1, at 4.
77. See Friedman & Krier, supra note 65, at 618-19. Note, The Oakland Leased
Housing Program, 20 STAN. L. Rav. 538, 543 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Oakland
Leased Housing Program].
78. SECTIoN 23 HANDBOOK, supra note 68, ch. 3, § 1, at 3-4. The proportion of
units which have been "leased in place" seems to have varied widely from one commu-
nity to another. In Chicago, 50% of the dwellings initially obtained under § 23 were
leased in place. In Oakland the figure was 20%. However, there were no such units
in the Washington, D.C. program. Friedman & Krier, supra note 65, at 620 & n.62.
79. SErxON 23 HANDBooi, supra note 68, ch. 3, § 1 at 4. One housing authority
has reported that while a "fair number" of its applicants have located housing in this
manner, the approach cannot be used with any real success in a "tight" housing market.
Interview with John Bums, Executive Director, Santa Clara County Housing Authority,
in Santa Clara, Cal., July 29, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Bums Interview].
80. See SEcON 23 HANDBOOK, supra note 68, ch. 3, § 2, at 4.
81. Bums Interview, supra note 79.
82. The local authority's assumption of management duties was both a selling
point for the program and a means of negotiating rents to levels significantly below
those prevailing on the "open" market. Bums Interview, supra note 79; Friedman &
Krier, supra note 65, at 613 n.16; Oakland Leased Housing Program, supra note 77, at
542-43.
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sible to allocate these duties according to the varying needs of both
owners and agencies.
Because section 23 was a public housing program, eligibility and
rent standards employed in conventional projects were generally appli-
cable to the leased units as well. Nevertheless, a few distinctions did
exist. For example, the actual selection of occupants for an assisted
unit was the participating landlord's privilege, although subject to con-
ditions stated by HUD in the ACC.83  Lessors could also suggest to
the LRA that a tenancy be terminated, but the decision to evict re-
mained, as in the conventional program, within the authority's sole dis-
cretion. s4 In any case, a tenant family could not be evicted from leased
housing on the grounds of excessive income; instead, when the family's
income increased, the LHA would reduce its share of the market rent
correspondingly, until a point was reached where the tenant required
no further subsidy.85 Lastly, although local governments still had to
approve the use of leased public housing within their communities, sec-
tion 23 required only a general resolution of assent. 86
Potentially, at least, section 23 held several advantages over the
conventional public housing system.17  First, since it was applicable to
existing units, the leasing method could be employed simply and with-
out the delays that accompany new construction.8  Second, the pro-
The degree to which local authorities have assumed maintenance responsibilities ap-
parently differs from program to program. The San Francisco and Oakland housing au-
thorities, for example, take responsibility for tenant-caused damage but leave normal
maintenance up to the participating owner. The San Mateo County Housing Authority,
on the other hand, carries out even routine maintenance with its own staff. The Santa
Clara County Housing Authority also assumes normal upkeep duties but has contracted
with an outside firm for that purpose. Telephone interviews with LH.A personnel, Dec.
17, 1974.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1421b(d) (1) (1970). This privilege was rarely exercised. See
text accompanying note 253 infra.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1421b(d)(3) (1970).
85. Catz, Historical and Political History of Federal Housing Programs, 50
N.D.L. REv. 25, 34 (1973). See also Ledbetter, Public Housing-A Social Experiment
Seeks Acceptance, 32 L. & CONTMM. PROB. 491, 512 (1967).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1421b(a) (2) (1970). A constitutional challenge against the lo-
cal approval restriction, based upon the claim that it discriminated against low-rent hous-
ing, was rejected in Lawrence v. Oakes, 361 F. Supp. 432 (D. Vt. 1973). Note also
that since the local government had no duty of "equivalent elimination" and the leased
units were not tax exempt (see notes 27-28 Yupra), there was less likelihood of commu-
nity objection to the program.
87. For a discussion of the expected benefits of § 23, see H.R. RE-P. No. 365, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9-15 (1965); SECtiON 23 HANnBooK, supra note 68, ch. 1, § 1, at 3-
4; Palmer, Section 23 Housing: Low-Rent Housing in Private Accommodations, 48 J.
URBAN L. 255 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Palmer]. See generally Friedman & Krier,
supra note 65.
88. By virtue of the expected speed with which the program could be implemented,
it was foreseen that § 23 would be highly useful in meeting relocation problems caused
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gram could be implemented in a highly versatile manner: housing
could be leased when and where needed, and so selected as to meet
the requirements of specific groups-large families or the elderly, for
example.8 9 By the same token, when certain units ceased to fill a de-
mand, they could be dropped from the program within a reasonable
time and new ones acquired in their place. Third, it was expected that
the prospect of an assured tenancy would induce many owners to re-
habilitate their dwellings in order to qualify for the program. In ad-
dition, two social benefits were foreseen. For one thing, section 23
promised to secure adequate shelter for the poor without the stigmatiz-
ing effects of typical public housing projects. Similarly, it carried the
potential of encouraging a better racial and economic mix in commu-
nities9" by enabling wide dispersal of assisted units throughout middle-
class neighborhoods.
The promise of section 23 has not been fully realized. While the
program did encourage a certain degree of rehabilitation, many of the
leased units were found to be actually substandard or only cosmetically
repaired. 91 Moreover, the temerity of most local authorities has pre-
vented the achievement of any real economic or racial integration.
92
by urban renewal, land clearance or natural disaster. SECTION 23 HANDBOOK, supra
note 68, ch. 1, § 1, at 3; Palmer, supra note 87, at 255-56.
89. H.R. REP. No. 365, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1965). It had become clear
by 1965 that, because of economic constraints, conventional projects could not be de-
signed to satisfy the housing needs of large families. Friedman & Krier, supra note 65,
at 626. For example, in 1964, the housing authority in Washington, D.C., reported hav-
ing only 13 five-bedroom apartments available for a waiting list of 478 families. Led-
better, Public Housing-A Social Experiment Seeks Acceptance, 32 L. CoNTEMP. PROB.
491, 512 (1967). Note also that of the 400 applications received by the St. Louis Hous-
ing Authority in March, 1970, 46% were from families requiring units with three or
more bedrooms. Palmer, supra note 87, at 264.
90. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 365, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-15 (1965); Friedman
& Krier, supra note 65, at 616-36.
91. Hartman & Keating, The Housing Allowance Delusion, SOCIAL POLICY, Jan.-
Feb. 1974, at 32-33 & n.5 [hereinafter cited as Hartman & Keating]. One observer sug-
gests that the poor condition of some of the leased units may be attributable to the
LHAs' concerns that strict enforcement of housing standards would lead both to a deple-
tion of units in the program and to a loss of landlord participation. Palmer, supra note
87, at 268-74. See also Friedman & Krier, supra note 65, at 632-33, where the authors
comment that rehabilitation of units for the leasing program did not stimulate anything
so significant as a general neighborhood improvement. On the other hand, many land-
lords in Oakland, California, did rehabilitate their units for the purpose of participating
in § 23. Oakland Leased Housing Program, supra note 77, at 542.
92. See Friedman & Krier, supra note 65, at 624-25; Palmer, supra note 87, at 278.
The housing authorities have been criticized for selecting only the most "socially desir-
able" families for leased housing and for failing to locate minority applicants outside
their own racial ghettoes. Nevertheless, many commentators have pointed out that, in
some respects, the LHAs' reluctance to promote integration has been based on under-
standable concerns. As § 23 relies on local involvement for its success, local authori-
ties have sought to maintain a good impression with participating landlords by admitting
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Nonetheless, section 23 has been a success in most other respects.93
It has been used extensively throughout the country,9 4 and has won the
support of housing authorities95 and local governments"8 alike. Con-
gress indicated its own approval in 1970 by extending the program's
applicability to newly constructed units97 and by providing that at least
30 percent of public housing appropriations would be allocated to leas-
ing projects. 5
More recently, the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment focused on section 23 as the vehicle with which to implement the
Nixon administration's own approach to housing problems. Over the
past few years, HUD has shown increasing displeasure with the per-
formance of public and subsidized housing programs,9 9 and in early
only the most promising tenants to leased units. Exclusion of the "problem families"
has been made that much easier by the fact that funds are commonly adequate for the
support of only a small proportion of applicants. Furthermore, if § 23 households are
to avoid the stigma attached to the receipt of housing assistance, they must have back-
grounds and life styles which generally conform to their surroundings; thus applicants
with "respectable" records have been preferred for housing in white, middle-class neigh-
borhoods. See Friedman & Krier, supra note 65, at 621-22.
93. In Oakland, for example, many lessors did rehabilitate their units for the pur-
pose of participating in § 23. Oakland Leased Housing Program, supra note 65 at 542.
The program has also been particularly useful to large families. Friedman & Krier, su-
pra note 65, at 627. Furthermore, a recent HUD study identified § 23 as the most cost-
efficient of its public housing programs. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DE-
VELOPMENT, HOUsING iN TE SEVENTiEs, published in Hearings on Housing and Com-
munity Development Legislation of 1973 Before the Subcomm. on Housing of the House
Comm. on Banking and Currency, pt. 3, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 1937, 2156 (1974).
Compare, however, 120 CONG. REc. 5718-23 (daily ed. June 25, 1974) (study conducted
by the Congressional Research Services which challenges some of HUD's conclusions
as to the cost of § 23 units).
94. As of June 30, 1972, approximately 162,000 units had been placed under
ACCs through the leasing program; over 75,000 of these dwellings were newly con-
structed. Memorandum on proposed leased housing legislation from Charles L. Edson,
Counsel, Section 23 Leased Housing Ass'n, to the Subcomm. on Housing of the House
Banking and Currency Comm., Mar. 29, 1974, attachment 5 [hereinafter cited as Edson].
The leasing program has been extensively employed in California, which by far has
the most § 23 housing of any state (nearly 39,000 units). Id. The major reason for
the program's popularity with California LHAs is that, unlike the conventional low rent
approach, it does not fall within the referendum restrictions of Article XXXIV of the
California Constitution (see note 64 supra). Winkelman v. City of Tiburon, 32 Cal.
App. 3d 834, 841-44, 108 Cal. Rptr. 415, 420-22 (1973); 47 Op. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 17
(1966).
95. Section 23 was endorsed by the National Association of Housing and Rede-
velopment Officials (NAHRO), which represents over 900 local authorities. Section 23
-Public Housing Leasing Program, J. HousNG, Feb. 1974, at 73. See note 109 infra.
96. The City of Palo Alto, California, has proposed, for example, that it con-
tribute funds to the § 23 program so that the local housing authority could afford to
lease within its relatively expensive rental market. Bums Interview, vupra note 79.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1421b(a)(3) (1970).
98. See Edson, supra note 94, at 1.
99. Unlike public housing the subsidy programs are directed toward encouraging
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1973, then Secretary Romney gave such displeasure its ultimate expres-
sion by impounding all funds for future low-rent developments. 100 The
freeze was "justified" on the grounds the existing programs were crip-
pled by statutory inconsistencies, inequities, and intolerably high
costs. 101 HUD stated that the time had come for a reassessment of fed-
eral policies. 0
the production of low and moderate-income units by private enterprise (limited dividend
or nonprofit sponsors). With regard to rental housing, the two most important exam-
ples of the subsidy approach are the § 221 (d) (3) Below Market Interest Rate (BMIR)
Program, Housing Act of 1961, § 101, 12 U.S.C.A. § 17151(d)(3) (1970), as amended
(Supp. 1975), and the more recent § 236 program, Housing & Urban Development Act
of 1968, § 201(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z-1 (1970), as amended (Supp. 1975).
Both programs seek to reduce housing costs by means of mortgage discounts. Un-
der § 221(d) (3), the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) is author-
ized to buy a qualified developer's mortgage at 3% interest. The difference between
the prevailing market interest rate and 3% represents the government subsidy, and en-
ables lower rental charges. See J. HELBRUN, URBAN ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY
287 (1974) [hereinafter cited as HEILBRuN]. Financing under § 236 is slightly differ-
ent. In that program, the private sponsor obtains a 40 year mortgage at market rates
and admits tenants whose incomes under the 1974 amendments must generally fall below
80% of the local median. The tenants pay at least 25% of their income toward rent
and HUD agrees to pay the sponsor a subsidy on behalf of each tenant equal to the
difference between the rent required to pay off the mortgage incurred and either: (1)
the rent which would be required to pay off a mortgage with an interest rate of only
1% or (2) the tenant's contribution, whichever is greater. See id. at 289-90. The §
236 program offers, therefore, a larger subsidy, which can be adjusted to account for
changes in tenant incomes. Neither of the mortgage discount mechanisms has, however,
succeeded in reducing rents to public housing levels. See A DECENT HOME, supra note
18, at 63 (table 2-2). (Nevertheless, extremely low rents in some § 236 units can be
obtained by the use of rent supplements, 12 U.S.C. § 1701s (1970), and the "deep sub-
sidies" authorized by the Housing & Community Development Act of 1974, § 212(2),
12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z-1 (f) (2) (Supp. 1975).)
Under both § 221(d) (3) (BMIR) and § 236, HUD controls project rents and must
approve all landlord requests for rate increases. The owner is required to sign a regula-
tory agreement which covers maintenance and some management duties. Eviction pro-
cedures are not discussed in the agreement, however. See generally Note, Procedural
Due Process in Government-Subsidized Housing, 86 HARV. L. RaV. 880, 885-87 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Due Process in Subsidized Housing].
100. Address by Secretary Romney to Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders' Convention,
Houston, Tex., Jan. 8, 1973, reported in New York Times, Jan. 9, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
HUD's action was not well-received by poverty groups and the construction industry.
In a subsequent suit to compel release of funds for subsidy programs, however, HUD's
right to withhold the money was sustained. Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 848 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
101. Hearings on the Suspension of Subsidized Housing Programs Before the
Subcomm. on Housing of the House Banking and Currency Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
55 (1974) (remarks of Secretary Lynn).
102. Address by Secretary Romney to Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders' Convention,
Houston, Tex., Jan. 8, 1973, at 8. Romney called "for a broad and extensive evaluation
of the entire Rube Goldberg structure of our housing and community development stat-
ute." Id.
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The alternative which it later proposed was the utilization of hous-
ing allowances. 10 3  This approach, briefly stated, is analogous to wel-
fare in that eligible families would be given direct cash payments as
a means of augmenting their economic capacity to obtain decent accom-
modations in the private sector.10 4  Proponents of the allowance
method argue that it will reduce bureaucratic expense and will free the
government from long-term commitments required for the support of
low and moderate-income housing construction. Furthermore, they
maintain that by enabling those assisted to lease whichever dwellings
they desire, freedom of choice can be expanded.1
0 5
Although Congress did authorize an experimental use of housing
allowances in 1970,106 HUD apparently decided to implement the con-
cept on a more intensive scale, and chose to modify the operation of
section 23 for that purpose. 0 7 Thus, in the first half of 1974, HUD
issued extensive regulations for the leasing program. Existing, newly
constructed, and rehabilitated housing were dealt with separately,'
but the new rules all shared two dominant characteristics: the LHA's
administrative role was more narrowly circumscribed, and the program
was reshaped to include elements of the direct cash payment idea. 09
At the same time, the administration proposed that section 23 be statu-
torily amended by the pending Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974, and that, as revised, the program function as the keystone
of national housing policy. Most of the suggested alterations are con-
tained in the measure ultimately enacted.
103. 119 CONG. REc. 8070, 8073 (1973) (President Nixon's message to Congress).
104. See HEiLBR , supra note 99, at 297-98; Weinstein, supra note 28, at 736-39.
105. For an argument on behalf of housing allowances, see HERUN , supra note
99, at 298-303. A highly critical appraisal of the direct cash payment idea is presented
in Hartman & Keating, supra note 91.
106. Housing & Urban Development Act of 1970, § 504, 84 Stat. 1786, as amended,
Housing & Community Development Act of 1974, § 804, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701z-3 (Supp.
1975).
107. See 120 CONG. Ruc. 2572-74 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1974) (remarks of Senator
Cranston).
108. 24 C.F.R. pt. 1272, 39 Fed. Reg. 14302 (1974) (new construction, effective
Apr. 22, 1974); id. pt. 1274, 39 Fed. Reg. 17186 (1974) (existing housing, effective
May 13, 1974); id. pt. 1276, 39 Fed. Reg. 24588 (1974) (substantial rehabilitation, ef-
fective July 3, 1974). The new rules were mandatory only as to those projects placed
under ACC after the appropriate xegulation's effective date.
109. These and other changes were severely criticized. After publishing proposed
regulations for the new construction program, HUD received more than 170 responses,
the majority of which opposed significant modifications in § 23. Edson, supra note 94,
at 4; see, e.g., letter from John Bums, Executive Director, Santa Clara County Housing
Authority to Office of the General Counsel, HUD, Feb. 5, 1974. Major objections to
the regulatory amendments are summarized in Section 23-Public Housing Leasing Pro-
gram, J. HousiNG, Feb. 1974, at 73; TRENDs iN HousmnG, Mar.-Apr. 1974, at 1, col. 1.
This opposition notwithstanding, HUD's final regulations showed little change from the
original proposals.
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Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Program
Section 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act 10 re-
places the original leased housing program with an approach which
generally conforms to the features of HUD's previous regulatory mod-
ifications. The act also promotes leasing from a supplementary role
and makes it almost completely independent of contractual public hous-
ing procedures. The LHA's responsibilities have thus been diminished,
while both HUD and participating owners have acquired greater au-
thority.
One shift in administrative control is demonstrated by the new re-
quirements for program implementation. With regard to existing units,
the distribution of funds remains much as it did before: local author-
ities execute ACCs with HUD, and then "enter into contracts to make
assistance payments to owners" of suitable accommodations."' When
110. Housing & Community Development Act of 1974, § 201 (a)8, 42 U.S.C.A. §
1437f (Supp. 1975) (§ 8 of the revised United States Housing Act of 1937). The stat-
utory revisions are effective January 1, 1975. Id. § 201(b), 88 Stat. 667. HUD has
promulgated new regulations to implement the § 8 program: 24 C.F.R. pt. 1273, 39 Fed.
Reg. 45169 (1974) (new construction); id. pt. 1275, 40 Fed. Reg. 3734 (1975) (exist-
ing housing); id. pt. 1277, 39 Fed. Reg. 45132 (1974) (substantial rehabilitation);
Proposed Reg. pt. 1278, 39 Fed. Reg. 42754 (1974) (state housing finance and develop-
ment agencies).
The rules pertaining to new construction and substantial rehabilitation are identical
in almost every respect; therefore, citations concerning these two programs will be made
to the new construction regulations only, except where different language is applicable
to substantially rehabilitated housing.
HUD's proposed regulations concerning state agencies have been designed so that
state entities which qualify under the expanded definition of "public housing agencies"
(see note 23 supra) may play a greater part in the administration of § 8 projects. See
24 C.F.R. § 1278.101, 39 Fed. Reg. 42754 (1974). Thus, in addition to general § 8
funds (for which state agency projects may qualify), HUD will make available certain
"set-aside" monies to state agencies for the development of statewide housing programs.
See Proposed Reg. § 1278.102-104, 39 Fed. Reg. 42754-55 (1974). The regulations
for state agencies contain all the elements needed to authorize state-administered § 8
projects. However, since many of these elements are substantially duplicated in the
other sets of rules, citations hereinafter will usually be to the regulations concerning only
the general existing housing and new construction (and substantial rehabilitation) pro-
grams.
At this point, a word should also be said concerning the status of § 23, as admin-
istered under HUD's modifying regulations. (See text accompanying notes 110-11
supra). HUD has determined that all ACCs for new construction or substantial reha-
bilitation which have been signed and accompanied by approvable project proposals by
December 31, 1974 will be processed according to § 23 and the applicable HUD regula-
tions. 39 Fed. Reg. 36128 (1974). Note also that the Housing & Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974 states that HUD may not apply new administrative policies to already
executed § 23 leases. § 208, 88 Stat. 669. See LAw PROJECT BULLETIN, supra note
6, at 23-24.
111. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(b)(1) (Supp. 1975). Note that HUD is now permitted
to assist existing housing "in areas where no public housing agency has been organized
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the dwellings are to be constructed or rehabilitated, however, a very
different arrangement prevails. In these cases, HUD is now authorized
to contract directly with lessors for housing support. The LHAs may
still participate-either by submitting their own development proposals
as in the case of private owners, or, at HUD's discretion, through the
traditional annual contributions process" --but the major responsibil-
ity for new and rehabilitated housing has clearly been transferred to
HUD. In this respect, section 8 differs markedly from the old leasing
approach, which, when amended to include new construction, gave
LHAs the exclusive ability to lease all types of dwellings. 113
Other changes effected by section 8 are embodied in the assist-
ance payments contract, the heart of the new program. In essence,
this document contains the promise of HUD or the LHA to provide a
monthly contribution toward a unit's market rent over a limited period
of time. 1 4 According to regulations issued under section 8, execution
of such an agreement does not allow HUD or the local authority to rent
the dwelling outright, as was typically done in the past."' Instead, an
or where the Secretary determines that a public housing agency is unable to implement
[the program]." Id.
112. See id. § 1437f(b)(2) (Supp. 1975). HUD's regulations do allow local au-
thorities to participate in § 8 new construction and substantial rehabilitation programs
through the use of ACCs. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 1273.103(d), 39 Fed. Reg. 45171
(1974); id. § 1273.103(v) (2), 39 Fed. Reg. 45174 (1974). Slightly different ACC pro-
visions will apply where state agencies utilize HUD set-aside money and provide perma-
nent financing without federal mortgage insurance. In such cases, the state agencies will
receive HUD contributions pursuant to Proposed Reg. §§ 1278.301-.320, 39 Fed. Reg.
42760-65 (1974). These special regulations are distinctive in that they accord qualified
state agencies considerable discretion in selecting private owners' construction and re-
habilitation proposals. Compare id. § 1273.203, 39 Fed. Reg. 45174 (1974), and id.
§§ 1273.208-.210(a), 39 Fed. Reg. 45176-78 (1974), with Proposed Reg. §§ 1278.307-
.310, 39 Fed. Reg. 42761 (1974). Additionally, it should be noted that if California
housing authorities intend to construct their own § 8 units, they must consider the appli-
cability of the state constitution's Article XXXIV. See note 64 supra.
113. See text accompanying notes 67, 97 supra.
114. Assistance contracts on newly constructed units may have an initial term of
five years, renewable exclusively by the owner for a total period of twenty years. 24
C.F.R. § 1273.103(g)(1), 39 Fed. Reg. 45172 (1974). These provisions are further
qualified, however, where the project is supported by a state agency or comprises mobile
homes. See id. §§ 1273.103(g)(2)-(4), 39 Fed. Reg. 45172 (1974).
For existing housing, the contract term is equal to the length of the lease, which
may vary from one to three years. Id. § 1275.103(f), 40 Fed. Reg. 3737 (1975). Com-
pare the lease term for newly constructed housing. Id. § 1273.213(c) (1), 39 Fed. Reg.
45180 (1974). Nevertheless, where a family continues in occupancy after the expiration
of the lease, but subject to its terms and conditions, the contract will remain in effect
for a total period of three years or until the expiration of the ACC. Id. § 1275.103(f),
40 Fed. Reg. 3737 (1975). The ACC term for the existing housing program is five years.
Id. § 1275.103(e), 40 Fed. Reg. 3737 (1975).
115. See, e.g., id. pt. 1273, app. II, § 1.6e, 39 Fed. Reg. 45188 (1974) (new con-
struction, housing assistance payments contract); id. pt. 1275, app. It, § 1.2c, 40 Fed.
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eligible family must itself procure and sign the actual lease.116 As a
result, the public agency is bound to contribute only the "assisted"
share of the total rent, while the family, as lessee, is to pay the remain-
der directly to the landlord. A further contractual limitation on the
duties of HUD or the LHA relates to units which are normally within
the program but are unoccupied. Under section 23, an LHA was re-
sponsible for the full rent on all of its leased dwellings regardless of
whether they were vacant or not (excepting, of course, any vacancies
attributable to fault of the private owner). The new legislation states,
in contrast, -that payments may be made for unoccupied dwellings only
where an assisted tenant has abandoned a unit in breach of the lease
or where the landlord is making a "good faith effort" to fill his vacancy.
Moreover, even in these circumstances, the owner receives merely par-
tial relief; the payments do not cover the complete market rent, and
they are to continue for no longer than sixty days."' Obviously, these
amendments have shifted the burden of locating occupants to the par-
ticipating landlord.
Appropriate market rents for section 23 housing were controlled
primarily by the amount of HUD's annual contribution, which was statu-
torily limited to the cost of constructing an equivalent, conventional
public housing project."18 The revised leasing program restricts the
price of acceptable units much more directly. Section 8 provides that
every year, or more frequently, HUD will calculate a "fair market
rental" for existing and newly constructed units of various types and
sizes. 1 9  Assistance contracts will in turn specify the maximum
Reg. 3747 (1975) (existing housing, housing assistance payments contract). Compare
text accompanying notes 81-82 supra.
116. See 24 C.F.R. § 1273.102(q), 39 Fed. Reg. 45170 (1974) (new construction);
id. § 1275.102(q), 40 Fed. Reg. 3735 (1975) (existing housing).
117. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c)(4) (Supp. 1975). HUD regulations provide that
owners may receive payments of up to 80% of a unit's market rent for the sixty-day pe-
riod, provided that certain conditions are fulfilled. 24 C.F.R. § 1273.103(e), 39 Fed.
Reg. 45171 (1974) (new construction); id. § 1275.103(e), 40 Fed. Reg. 3736 (1975)
(existing housing).
118. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
119. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c)(1) (Supp. 1975). HUD has defined the term "fair
market rental" as "the rent, including utilities (except telephone), range and refrigera-
tors, and all maintenance, management, and all other services, which.. . would be re-
quired to be paid in privately owned, existing, decent, safe, and sanitary rental housing
of modest (non-luxury) nature with suitable amenities." 24 C.F.R. § 1275.102(i), 40
Fed. Reg. 3735 (1975). A comparable definition appears in the regulations for new
construction. Id. § 1273.102(g), 39 Fed. Reg. 45170 (1974).
The conferees on the Housing & Community Development Act observed that "the
establishment of realistic fair market rentals win be a prime factor in the success or fail-
ure of the new housing assistance program." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 7, at
139. They added that HUD would be expected to consult reliable sources familiar with
rental conditions in various markets when setting the various rent levels. Id. Their
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monthly rent to which an owner is entitled for his apartment. This
maximum may not exceed the applicable fair market rent by more than
10 percent unless HUD determines that local needs require otherwise;
in this case, a 20 percent excess may be allowed.' 2 Assistance con-
tracts must also provide that maximum rents will be adjusted at least
annually to reflect changes in the fair market rent figure or, "if the
Secretary determines, on the basis of a reasonable formula."'121 Partic-
ipating landlords are not required to provide any financial justification
for such a rental increase and, except in the case of existing housing,
the adjustment will be made by HUD automatically. 122  On the other
hand, if a landlord can "clearly demonstrate" that his necessary ex-
penses will not be covered by these adjustments, he may obtain a fur-
ther increase from HUD, providing that the ultimate rate does not ma-
terially differ from that charged for similar nonassisted housing.
123
concern for local feedback is emphasized by the statutory requirement that fair market
rent figures be published in the Federal Register for comment prior to actual implemen-
tation. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c) (1) (Supp. 1975).
The fair market rent concept was introduced by HUD's regulatory modifications to
§ 23. See 24 C.F.R. § 1272.102(a), 39 Fed. Reg. 14304 (1974) (new construction).
Unfortunately, the market levels which HUD ultimately established for the revised § 23
have in several instances been criticized as being too low. Burns Interview, supra note
79; see 2 HoUsInG & DEv. REP.--CuP.ENT DEvELOPMENTS 608 (1974). Should HUD's
fair market rents for § 8 housing also prove impracticable, both in terms of encouraging
private developers to participate and of obtaining decent units in the existing supply, ad-
ditional subsidies from state financing agencies or local governments may be required.
See note 109 supra.
120. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c) (1) (Supp. 1975). HUD rules for the new construc-
tion program state that "[i]n any case, the Contract Rents as proposed must be...
reasonable in relation to the quality, location, amenities, methods and terms of financ-
ing, and management and maintenance services of the project . . . ." 24 C.F.R. §
1273.103(f) (2), 39 Fed. Reg. 45172 (1974). Similar language as to the "test of rea-
sonableness" appears in the regulations for existing housing. Id. § 1275.103(d) (1) (ii),
40 Fed. Reg. 3736 (1975).
121. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c) (2) (A) (Supp. 1975).
122. Id. with regard to newly constructed units, the rents will be adjusted each year
in accordance with "the applicable Automatic Adjustment Factor most recently published
by HUD." 24 C.F.R. § 1273.103(h)(2)(ii), 39 Fed. Reg. 45172 (1974). (As of this
writing, no such "factor" has been developed.) Where existing housing is involved, sub-
sequent adjustments will be limited to the change in the appropriate fair market rent
and will be made only in those years in which the landlord may terminate the lease.
Id. § 1275.103(d)(2)(i), 40 Fed. Reg. 3736 (1975). In these inflationary times, the
latter restriction could effectively discourage participant owners from entering a lease
with more than a twelve month term. Of course, the shorter the lease, the less the ten-
ant's security from termination without cause.
Note also, that unlike the owner of newly constructed housing, the landlord of an
existing unit must request this adjustment and demonstrate compliance with his lease.
Id. § 1275.103 (d) (2), 40 Fed. Reg. 3736 (1975).
123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437f(c) (2) (B), (C) (Supp. 1975). The burden of clear dem-
onstration is imposed by HUD regulations. E.g., 24 C.F.R. § 1273.103(h) (3), 39 Fed.
Reg. 45172 (1974) (new construction).
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These procedures give HUD the primary role in defining acceptable
market rents for the new program; to that extent, they also enable HUD
to affect the quality and availability of the housing on which assistance
payments may be made.
The new legislation enables HUD to control the physical distribu-
tion of assisted dwellings as well. The act does provide that every unit
in a given structure may be placed under a payments contract. How-
ever, it further states that, in allocating funds, HUD may give prefer-
ence to applications proposing to assist only 20 percent of a building's
units, except where the building contains fifty units or less, or is desig-
nated for the elderly."' HUD's regulations demonstrate that this pref-
erence will be exercised where new or rehabilitated units are con-
cerned. 125 In contrast, section 23 allowed local authorities to waive
distribution requirements and, in practice, those which did so were ap-
parently at no disadvantage when seeking program funds. 26
Section 8 differs from both the conventional and the earlier leased
124. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c)(5) (Supp. 1975). The 20% priority may be used
to rank only those applications which have been received within the same 60 day period.
Id. This distribution requirement illustrates the congressional concern for "economic
mix," a goal that the § 8 program is expressly designed to promote. Id. § 1437f(a).
On the other hand, the likelihood that developers will be unable to obtain assistance
payments on all of the units in large family-oriented apartment projects has caused in-
vestors to look warily upon such building proposals. See 2 HousuNG & DEv. REP.-CuR-
RENr DEVELOPMENTS 607, 870 1974-75.
125. 24 C.F.R. § 1273.103(b)(1), 39 Fed. Reg. 45171 (1974); id. § 1273.203
(e) (3), 39 Fed. Reg. 45177 (1974) (new construction). Two other factors affecting
HUD's evaluation of § 8 proposals are also worth noting. First, HUD requires that
all public housing agencies which seek to develop their own projects arrange for reloca-
tion payments to displaced site residents in accordance with Uniform Relocation & Real
Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4601 (1970). 24 C.F.R. §
1273.103(k)(1), 39 Fed. Reg. 45173 (1974). In the case of privately sponsored devel-
opments, HUD will attach greater weight to proposals which do not involve displace-
ment or which minimize the hardship of relocation. The regulations do not, however,
apply the Uniform Relocation & Real Property Acquisition Policies Act to private own-
ers. Id. § 1273.103(k)(2), 39 Fed. Reg. 45173 (1974). Compare HUD's § 23 regula-
tions, which did require owners to satisfy the Act's provisions. Id. § 1272.208(a) (5),
39 Fed. Reg. 14309 (1974) (new construction). Second, HUD states that its field of-
fices should select proposals which will contribute to the goal of having three-bedroom
units (or larger) account for one-fifth of all § 8 housing. Id. § 1273.103(b) (2), 39
Fed. Reg. 45171 (1974) (new construction).
No equivalent priorities are established in the existing housing program. The rea-
son, no doubt, lies in the fact that the choice of housing is ultimately left to the appli-
cant family.
Under special procedures developed for certain state agency proposals, neither the
20% "economic mix" nor the large dwelling unit priorities will be applied. See Pro-
posed Reg. § 1278.306(b), 39 Fed. Reg. 42760 (1974). These factors will, however,
affect the amount of § 8 funds to be "set aside" for the agency's exclusive use. Id. §
1278.104(d) (5), 39 Fed. Reg. 42755 (1974).
126. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
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public housing programs in that it needs no formal approval from local
governments before being put into effect. 127  Congress has retained
some community involvement, however, by providing that HUD may
not accept any leasing proposal unless it is consistent with the appropri-
ate local "housing assistance plan."'128  It is for HUD to decide which
applications have satisfied this requirement, but the legislative history
suggests that a locality's findings of inconsistency should be disregarded
only for substantial reasons. 29
Major differences between section 8 and its predecessor are read-
ily apparent in the areas of program management and operation. Eli-
gible applicants are now defined as "lower-income families."' 30  While
the statutory meaning of "families" remains substantially unchanged,'
the subject of allowable incomes has been rewritten entirely. Local
authorities no longer have any role in determining a maximum income,
even with regard to their own leasing projects. Congress has instead
decided to qualify every family with an income of no more than four-
fifths the local median, as determined and adjusted according to family
size by HUD. 132  Similarly, the new legislation discards the earlier re-
quirement that an LHA have an admissions policy affording priorities
to particularly necessitous households. As a partial equivalent, section
8 provides that at least 30 percent of the families assisted have "very
low-incomes"-that is, incomes half or less than half of the median for
127. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(h) (Supp. 1975). Compare notes 27, 86 & accom-
panying text supra.
128. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1439(a) (Supp. 1975). A housing assistance plan is required
of all applicants seeking community development funds under § 106 of the Housing &
Community Development Act. Id. § 5304(a). An adequate housing assistance plan
must assess the housing needs of the community's low-income population, must state an
annual goal for the number of households to be assisted, and must indicate general loca-
tions of proposed low-priced housing with the goal, among others, of "promoting greater
choice of housing opportunities and avoiding undue concentrations of assisted persons
in areas containing a high proportion of low-income persons ... ." Id. § 5304(a) (4).
Where a § 8 project is proposed for a community which has a housing assistance
plan, HUD must inform the appropriate local government of the application which it
has received, and afford the locality thirty days within which to evaluate the proposal.
Id. § 1434(2) (1). Should the community determine that the suggested project is incon-
sistent with its housing plan, HUD may approve the application only if it comes to the
opposite conclusion. Id. § 1439(a) (2). Should the local government fail to make a
timely objection, the proposal may still be rejected if HUD itself finds the project incon-
sistent with the relevant housing plan. Id. § 1439(a) (3).
As to situations where the above procedure may be disregarded or where no housing
plan exists see id. § 1439(b), (c).
129. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 145.
130. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(a) (Supp. 1975).
131. See notes 31-33 & accompanying text supra.
132. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1427f(f) (1) (Supp. 1975). Note that HUD may set limits
above or below the 80% figure where it believes that circumstances so require.
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the area-when the units are "initially" rented. 133  The revised pro-
gram has also been exempted from the other admissions procedures
required in conventional public housing and previously applied to sec-
tion 23;114 thus applicants who have been declared ineligible for leased
housing have no statutory right to respond at an informal hearing.
As before, a tenant's rent is limited to a certain percentage of his
income, but in many respects, the new legislation departs significantly
from the original Brooke Amendments. In most instances the maxi-
mum rent does remain fixed at 25 percent of an occupant's income.
However, among large very low-income families, very large low-income
families, and households with "exceptional expenses," the highest rate
has been lowered to 15 percent.' For tenants with similar economic
burdens, intermediate ratios may also be provided, but section 8 has
delegated the responsibility of establishing these levels to HUD, not to
the local authorities. 13 6 Additionally, a minimum rent requirement, set
at 15 percent, has been newly instituted.137 It should be noted as well
that henceforth rents are to be determined on the basis of gross rather
than adjusted income; 18 consequently, families not having "exceptional
expenses" (however defined by HUD) may discover that the new pro-
gram requires a greater monthly contribution.
Section 8 deals with remaining management functions by distin-
guishing once more between programs for existing housing and those
for new construction or rehabilitation. Where existing units are in-
volved, the provisions for tenant selection, eviction, and maintenance
133. Id. § 1437(c) (7). Although the statute applies the 30% requirement in terms
of the entire § 8 program, HUD has chosen to impose the provision on each project,
24 C.F.R. § 1273.103(s), 39 Fed. Reg. 45174 (1974) (new construction); id. § 1275.103
(1), 40 Fed. Reg. 3738 (1975) (existing housing). Note that although Congress has
applied the income quota only to the time when units are "initially" rented, the HUD
rules on new construction (and rehabilitation) provide that a participating developer
must continue to "exercise his best efforts to maintain at least 30 percent occupancy of
contract units by very low-income families." Id. § 1273.103(s), 39 Fed. Reg. 45174
(1974). LHAs are under a similar duty in admitting families to the existing housing
program. Id. § 1275.103(1), 40 Fed. Reg. 3738 (1975).
There is, on the other hand, considerable doubt as to the adequacy of the congres-
sional definition of "very low-income." See note 39 supra.
134. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(h) (Supp. 1975).
135. Id. § 1437f(c) (3). The 1974 revisions to the United States Housing Act omit
any definitions of large or very large families. HUD's regulations have filled this gap
by categorizing a household with six or more minors as "large" and a household with
eight or more minors as "very large." E.g., 24 C.F.R. § 1273.103(t), 39 Fed. Reg.
45174 (1974).
136. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c) (3) (Supp. 1975).
137. Id. Compare the new minimum rent levels for conventional public housing,
discussed in note 45 supra.
138. See 42U.S.C.A. §§ 1437f(f)(1), (2) (Supp. 1975).
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duties are exactly the same as in section 23.119 Nevertheless, the prac-
tical consequences under the revised program should be very different;
HUD regulations and other statutory changes in the leasing approach
give the owner much greater control of inanagement than previously. 40
In any case, there can be little doubt as to the transfer of control where
new or rehabilitated housing is to be assisted. The legislation provides
that in such a case "[t]he contract between the Secretary [of HUD]
and the owner. . shall provide that all ownership, management, and
maintenance responsibilities, including the selection of tenants and the
termination of tenancy, shall be assumed by the owner ....
The administration has great expectations for the new program.
It believes that section 8 will assure an adequate control of costs, will
meet the needs of families with the lowest incomes, and will promote
better maintenance of units and a better selection of sites. 142  Many
groups involved with low-rent housing do not share this confidence. 143
Their concerns are summarized in the following excerpt from a report
by the Appropriation Committee of the House Subcommittee on Hous-
ing and Urban Development. After noting that HUD intends to cut
back earlier programs in favor of the leasing approach, the report
states:
The Committee feels that it would be a tragic error to take
this course. First [section 8] may not work. Second, if it does
work, it could take a very long time to go into effect. Third, even
if it works, it may not do two important things, namely serve the
139. Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(d) (1) (Supp. 1975) (§ 8 program), with 42
U.S.C.A. § 1421b(d) (1970) (§ 23 program).
140. See text accompanying notes 154-74, 256-71 infra.
141. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(e) (2) (Supp. 1975). The statute does provide also that
the owner may contract for the performance of such duties with "any entity, including
a public housing agency, approved by the Secretary. . . " Id. However, this preroga-
tive has been limited by HUD in two ways. First, although participating landlords may
arrange for the 'provision of management, maintenance or similar services by another
entity, no such arrangement will be permitted to shift the actual responsibility of per-
forming these tasks from the landlord himself. Second, HUD provides that "no entity
which is responsible for the administration of [the housing assistance payments] Con-
tract . . . may contract to perform management and maintenance of the project." 24
C.F.R. § 1273.103(u), 39 Fed. Reg. 45174 (1974). Thus, where local authorities par-
ticipate in new construction or rehabilitation programs, their role will be much more re-
stricted than previously. At least one LIA believes that this restriction is not in the
tenants' and applicants' best interests. Telephone interview with John Bums, Executive
Director, Santa Clara County Housing Authority, Dec. 20, 1974.
Note that the same limitations on an owner's power to assign his duties and an
LHA's ability to manage are also contained in HUD's regulations for existing housing
projects. 24 C.F.R. § 1275.103(q) (6), 40 Fed. Reg. 3739 (1975).
142. See 10 WEEKLY COMPLmATION OF PREsmnwnNxL DocutrMTrs 1060 (1974)
(President Ford's remarks on the Housing & Community Develop. Act of 1974).
143. See 2 HousNo & Day. REP.-CuRRENT DEVELOPmENTS 870 (1975). See
notes 119, 124, 141 supra.
March 19751 1173
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
kind of low income families that public housing helped, and in the
regions or areas where housing is most needed.
Under [section 8], the builders become the housing managers.
It would seem that since they must rent out the units they will seek
the elderly, those without children and the upper reaches of low
and moderate income families.
The large poor families and the very poor families, for whom
public housing was such a great program may well be left out in
the cold.144
Evictions
Every tenant whose lease is terminated suffers some degree of
hardship, but there is little doubt that the gravest consequences are
those experienced by the low-income family which has been expelled
from public housing.' 45  It is thus hardly surprising that the poor have
fought to restrict the powers and methods which may be used to evict
eligible renters from federally assisted units. The new leasing pro-
gram, however, incorporates only a few of the safeguards provided to
tenants of conventional low-rent projects, and it appears likely that
evictions from section 8 housing will provoke substantial litigation.
The source of the expected conflict can be seen by comparing termi-
nation procedures under the former leasing program with those to be
used under the present system.
Eviction Procedures Under Section 23
Section 23 gave the LHAs ultimate control over evictions from
leased housing, 46 just as earlier legislation had accorded them similar
discretion in administering conventional projects. 4 7  To prevent the
144. 120 CONG. REc. 14333 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1974).
145. Not only will evicted low-income families find it difficult, if not impossible,
to obtain decent housing at an affordable price in the private market, but the expense
of moving will also weigh heavily on their budget. This is to say nothing, of course,
of the psychological injury (especially among the aged) which accompanies forced re-
location. See Public Landlords and Private Tenants, supra note 51, at 990-91 & nn.19-
20.
Evictions in federally assisted housing appear to be the exception, rather than the
rule. See Due Process in Subsidized Housing, supra note 99, at 905. Nevertheless, a
landlord's mere ability to evict can be used effectively to coerce tenant compliance with
unpopular management policies, such as the assessment of fines for alleged damage or
late rental payments. This coercive device is all that more powerful when applied to
public housing residents, who commonly have more at stake in their tenancies than most
renters. See Friedman, supra note 19, at 660-61. Thus, to the extent that lessees gain
greater security from the threat of eviction, the greater will be their power to bargain
for reformed management policies.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1421b(d) (3) (1970). See text accompanying note 84 supra.
147. See 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970). See note 49 & accompanying text supra.
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abuse of such powers, however, HUD imposed certain limits on an au-
thority's ability to terminate tenancies. Among the most important of
these restrictions is the Model Grievance Procedure, which contains
mandatory standards for the handling of tenant complaints. The model
procedure requires local authorities to provide hearings whenever ten-
ants dispute authority actions affecting their status or welfare, 14 8 as an
eviction obviously would. The standards provide that a complainant
is to be given timely notice of the hearing date, along with the rules
governing -the hearing itself and a detailed explanation of the reasons
for the contested LHA action."4 9 Tenants must be allowed to inspect
and copy documents bearing upon their complaints, and they have the
rights to be assisted by counsel and to confront and cross-examine wit-
nesses at the hearing. HUD requires that complainants make a prima
facie case, at which point the burden of proof shifts to the local author-
ity to justify its challenged conduct. The dispute is to be resolved by
an impartial individual, or a hearing panel, whose conclusions must be
based exclusively on the facts presented at the hearing. A written dis-
position of the case, with a statement of supportive facts and reason-
ing, must also be prepared and given to the complaining party.150
In addition to these procedural safeguards, HUD has established
various rules concerning the contents of public housing rental agree-
ments. The Model Lease, which is the most comprehensive of such
rules, was never applied to section 23,' 11 but local authorities partici-
pating in that program were required to comply with other relevant
HUD provisions. A 1970 circular, for example, prohibited the use, in
public housing leases, of certain objectionable terms and conditions,
such as exculpatory clauses, confessions of judgment, and waivers of
right to legal proceedings or of right to jury trial. 52  Furthermore, in
an earlier notice, HUT stated that eviction (or denial of admission)
for nondesirability must be based on actual or threatened behavior
148. See note 55 supra.
149. Model Grievance Procedure, supra note 2, at 2. Compare Proposed Grievance
Procedure, supra note 2, which does not expressly require that the notice contain an ex-
planation of the local authority's proposed action. See 39 Fed. Reg. 39288 (1974).
Note, however, that the Proposed Grievance Procedure contains new provisions for pre-
hearing informal conferences, at which, no doubt, the LHA's position would be pre-
sented. Id.
150. Model Grievance Procedure, supra note 2, at 2. The Proposed Grievance Pro-
cedure does not explicitly state that a complainant will receive a notice of the disposi-
tion of his grievance in all cases, although it does contemplate his being informed of
an adverse decision on an eviction issue. See 39 Fed. Reg. 39289 (1974).
151. Model Lease, supra note 2, at 4.
152. U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Development, Prohibition of Certain Provi-
sions in Low-Rent Public Housing Leases, HUD Circular RHM 7465.6 (Aug. 10, 1970).
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likely -to interfere with other tenants.' 53 The notice expressly forbade
such evictions when based solely on a person's former conduct or on
the conduct of a person related to him.
Eviction Procedures Under Section 8
With regard to evictions from assisted existing units, section 8 pro-
vides that the public housing agency "shall have the sole right to give
notice to vacate, with the owner having the right to make representa-
tion to the agency for termination of tenancy. . . .",' The same lan-
guage was applied in the original leasing program. New regulations
have modified the actual procedures considerably, however. HUD has
decided not to apply the Model Grievance Procedure to section 8 exist-
ing housing,' 55 and in its stead, has issued instructions which deal with
evictions specifically.' 56 Under these rules, a lessor may not eject as-
sisted tenants "unless he complies with the requirements of local law,
if any" and gives the occupants "a written notice of the proposed evic-
tion, stating the grounds [upon which eviction is based].' 7  This
notice must also inform low-income renters that they may respond to
the owner within ten days (or more, should local law so require) or
may, within the same period, present their objections in person or in
writing to the local authority. In any case, the LHA is required to "ex-
amine the grounds for the eviction and . . .authorize the eviction un-
less it finds the grounds insufficient under the lease."'' 55 The author-
ity's rejection or approval of the lessor's action must be made within
twenty days of the date on which the family received the notice. 59
In the new construction and substantial rehabilitation programs,
section 8 places -the responsibility for the termination of tenancies on
the owner himself.16 0  Accordingly, HUD has not required developers
to follow any particular eviction process, 16  with two exceptions. First,
where public housing agencies construct or rehabilitate their own units,
they must implement not only HUD's Model Grievance Procedure, but
its Model Lease as well.' 62 Second, every owner must abide by certain
153. U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development, HUD Circular 12-7-68,
§ 2c. See note 54 supra.
154. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(a) (Supp. 1975).
155. 24 C.F.R. § 1275.207(p), 40 Fed. Reg. 3743 (1975).




160. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(e) (2) (Supp. 1975). See also note 141 supra.
161. See 24 C.F.R. § 1273.218(d), 39 Fed. Reg. 45181 (1974).
162. Id. § 1273.218(k). As a result of the applicability of these restrictions to
agency-owned housing, tenants in such units will be afforded the same rights as residents
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termination procedures if he is to qualify for temporary assistance pay-
ments on a unit from which the low-income family has been evicted.16
3
Specifically the lessor must certify that he gave the tenant "a written
notice of the proposed eviction, stating the grounds and advising the
family that it has 10 days within which to present its objections to -the
owner in person or in writing."' 64  The eviction must also not be in
violation of local law, the assistance payments contract, or the lease.
As has been mentioned, leases will now be negotiated and signed
by the owner and the eligibile tenant, not by the local authority or
HUD. 16 5 Nevertheless, these agencies can exercise some control over
lease provisions through the housing assistance payments contract, and
HUD regulations do indeed require that a few conditions be met. All
leases must, for example, contain a provision that the landlord may not
discriminate against the lessee on the basis of race, color, creed, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin. 66 Rental agreements for existing units
must recite the applicable eviction procedure as well.' 67 Finally, assist-
ance contracts may not be executed where the proposed lease contains
objectionable provisions-such as exculpatory clauses-of the type pre-
viously outlawed in public housing leases.
168
In almost every respect, however, section 8, as administered by
HUD, provides low-income tenants with far less security against ar-
bitrary evictions than have the conventional and previous leased public
housing programs. The new regulations contain two fundamental de-
ficiencies. First, HUD nowhere clearly states that tenancies may be
terminated only for cause. This inadequacy is perhaps not critical in
the existing housing program since renters will be aware from their
leases that owners must indicate some grounds for eviction, and that
complaints may be taken to the LHA. 69 More serious, however, is
HUD's failure to demand good cause as a prerequisite to any eviction
from new or rehabilitated units. Where a participating owner has a
waiting list of "respectable" low-income applicants, he may decide not
of conventional low-rent projects. This note will focus, however, on the § 8 program
as it is to be operated in situations where the housing is privately owned.
163. Id. § 1273.103(e)(3)(ii), 39 Fed. Reg. 45172(1974). See also note 117
supra.
164. 24 C.F.R. § 1273.103(e)(3)(ii), 39 Fed. Reg. 45172 (1974).
165. See text accompanying notes 115-16 supra.
166. 24 C.F.R. § 1273.218(c) (2), 39 Fed. Reg. 45180 (1974) (new construction)
(addendum to lease § c); id. pt. 1275, app. VI, 40 Fed. Reg. 3751 (1975) (existing hous-
ing) (addendum to lease § f).
167. Id.
168. Id. § 1273.218(c)(3), 39 Fed. Reg. 45180 (1974) (new construction); id. pt.
1275, app. VII, 40 Fed. Reg. 3751 (1975) (existing housing). See text accompanying
note 152 supra.
169. See text accompanying notes 157-59 supra.
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to renew his leases with less preferable assisted occupants in order to
fill their apartments with the "preferred" families.17 0 In such a circum-
stance, the dwellings would remain unoccupied only briefly; the land-
lord would thus have little need of assistance payments during the pe-
riod of vacancy, and so would have just as little interest in complying
with HUD's eviction procedure. Furthermore, even where lessors do
request that assistance payments be continued for vacancies which re-
sult from eviction, the HUD rules require only a certification that
tenancies were terminated in accordance with regulatory standards.' 7,
There is, however, no adequate means of verifying such certifica-
tions. 172  The renters themselves are poorly equipped to check the pos-
sibility of fraud since, under the regulations at least, they have no clear
right to demand that on their own behalf the HUD eviction procedure
be satisfied. 73  The occupants may, in fact, be quite unaware of these
HUD provisions, as there is no requirement that they be mentioned in
the leases for new or rehabilitated housing. Finally, it is doubtful that
tenant interests will be effectively protected even when the HUD evic-
tion process is followed properly. The regulations only imply that good
cause is necessary, and while the assistance contract prohibits owners
from discriminating against welfare recipients and unwed mothers,
174
these restrictions are not communicated to lessees by the rental agree-
ment.
Inextricably linked with the failure to state clearly a requirement
of good cause is the inadequacy of HUD's procedural safeguards against
arbitrary lease terminations. This second deficiency in the rules will
most seriously affect the assisted tenant in new or rehabilitated housing.
HUD grants to that occupant an illusory right of objecting to his land-
lord, the very person who has decided to evict him. This arrangement
170. This tactic would be especially plausible in a seller's market, as it traditionally
has been where low-priced rental housing is concerned.
171. 24 C.F.R. § 1273.103(e)(3)(ii), 39 Fed. Reg. 45172 (1974) (new construc-
tion).
172. HUD does indicate in its housing assistance payments contracts that it will
periodically review the propriety of the owner's requests for assistance payments. Id.
pt. 1273, app. II, § 1.9f, 39 Fed. Reg. 45189 (1974) (new construction). Whether such
reviews will be adequate to deter or to detect owner misrepresentations remains to be
seen.
173. The regulations require that the HUD eviction procedure be followed only as
a condition to receiving assistance payments on vacant units. See note 163 & accompany-
ing text supra. Since the tenant to be evicted has no knowledge of whether his lessor
will request such payments, and since he has no immediate interest in whether those
payments are made, he is in a poor position to demand that the HUD procedure be ap-
plied in his case.
174. 24 C.F.R. pt. 1273, app. II, § 2.1a, 39 Fed. Reg. 45189 (1974) (new con-
struction); id. pt. 1273, app. II, § 2.1a, 40 Fed. Reg. 3749 (1975) (existing housing).
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is hardly conducive to an impartial assessment of the tenant's position.
Other weaknesses of such an informal hearing procedure are visible in
the existing housing program as well. In none of its regulations does
HUD suggest that assisted lessees are entitled to an adversary hearing
in which they may confront and interrogate those seeking to evict them.
Nowhere is it stated that the tenant may examine documents relating
to his case so as better to prepare a defense. Yet where facts are in
dispute, as they usually are in contested evictions, it would seem essen-
tial that these procedural safeguards be provided..7 5  If the tenant can
respond only to bare accusations made in the lessor's notice, his rebuttal
will often be similarly incomplete, with the result that a fair disposition
of his case will be greatly hindered. This problem is exacerbated by
HUID's failure to require that participating local authorities, not to men-
tion private owners, state the findings and reasons on which an eviction
is approved. Without such a statement, the renter has no assurance
that his case has been adequately reviewed or that his response has
even been considered.
Admittedly, widespread abuse of the eviction process is not inevi-
table. Many section 8 developers, especially nonprofit sponsors or state
entities, may be more interested in providing decent low-rent accom-
modations than in operating apartment projects for finanicial gain.
Moreover, the agencies which are to supervise the new program will,
it is assumed, endeavor to see that it is run equitably. Nevertheless,
the potential for unfair landlord behavior is very real, and where
abuses do occur, the present regulations do not provide tenants with
a satisfactory means of obtaining relief. It is unlikely that HUD will
amend these procedures to afford tenants greater security; such an ac-
tion would restrict an owner's freedom to implement his own manage-
ment policies and, in HUD's view, at least, might discourage the in-
volvement of private enterprise. Vindication of the assisted families'
interests must, therefore, be sought in the courts.
Due Process Requirements in Eviction Procedures
Until recently, public housing residents who were threatened with
175. See generally 1 K. DAVIS, ADmmqiSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.05 (1958 &
Supp. 1970) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS]. Note also the following language in Greene
v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959): "Certain principles have remained relatively
immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where government action seriously
injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends upon fact findings,
the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual
so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the
case of documentary evidence, it is even more important where the evidence consists of
the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty, or who, in fact, might be
perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or
jealousy."
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eviction could expect to receive little assistance from the judiciary.
Courts commonly permitted local authorities to terminate tenancies
without stating any reason or providing renters with any opportunity
to be heard. The decisions required nothing more than that the LHAs
comply with the terms of their rental agreements." 7' This policy of
minimal review was supported on the complementary grounds that oc-
cupancy of low-rent housing was not a "right" but merely a privilege,
to be administered as local authorities thought best,"77 and that such
agencies should have the same power to evict as had private land-
lords. 178  An early departure from these attitudes appeared in Rudder
v. United States,170 in which a federal circuit court stated: "The gov-
ernment as landlord is still the government. It must not act arbitrarily,
for, unlike private landlords, it is subject to the requirements of due
process of law."'180 Later cases also held that LHAs could not expel
176. See generally Nonfinancial Eligibility and Eviction Standards in Public Hous-
ing, supra note 51, at 1124-26; Public Landlords and Private Tenants, supra note 51,
at 94-97.
177. See Brand v. Chicago Housing Auth., 120 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1941); Munici-
pal Housing Auth. v. Walck, 277 App. Div. 791, 97 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1950).
The privilege doctrine had neither its source nor its sole application in public hous-
ing cases. Rather, it embodied the traditional view that government benefits were mere
gratuities in which the recipient had no legally protected interest. It was therefore con-
sidered that procedural safeguards need not accompany the withdrawal or withholding
of such benefits from the persons who sought them. See United States ex rel. Knauff
v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (exclusion of alien); Bailey v. Richardson, 182
F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (loss
of government employment).
Limitations on the privilege doctrine were quickly recognized, however, and courts
began to require that denials of public employment and occupational licenses be attended
by at least rudimentary due process. See, e.g., Willner v. Committee on Character, 373
U.S. 96 (1962) (license to practice law); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959)
(government security clearance required for private employment); Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183 (1952) (employment at state college). It was also held that government
benefits could not be administered on the basis of conditions which require recipients
to surrender constitutionally protected rights. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (religion); Wieman v. Updegraff, supra. For a general analysis' of the right-
privilege doctrine and of its decline, see DAVIs, supra note 175, §§ 7.01-.20; Van Alstyne,
The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Hnv. L. REv.
1439 (1968). See also notes 183-85 infra.
178. See, e.g., Walton v. City of Phoenix, 69 Ariz. 26, 208 P.2d 309 (1949); Chi-
cago Housing Auth. v. Ivory, 341 Ill. App. 282, 93 N.E.2d 386 (1950); New York City
Housing Auth. v. Russ, 1 Misc. 2d 170, 134 N.Y.S.2d 812 (App. T., 1st Dep't 1954);
Columbus Metropolitan Housing Auth. v. Simpson, 85 Ohio App. 73, 85 N.E.2d 560
(1950); Pittsburgh Housing Auth. v. Turner, 201 Pa. Super. 62, 191 A.2d 869 (1963).
179. 226 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
180. Id. at 53. Rudder concerned an eviction prompted by the now defunct Gwinn
Amendment, which excluded from public housing any member of an organization desig-
nated as subversive by the Attorney General. Act of July 31, 1953, ch. 302, 67 Stat.
307. Where the Gwinn Amendment was involved courts were quite willing to apply due
process and equal protection standards to LHA's. See Housing Authority v. Cordova,
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project residents for constitutionally protected behavior.181/ Finally, in
Ruffin v. Housing Authority,'82 a federal district court held that public
housing tenants could not be evicted without having been afforded pro-
cedural safeguards. 183 As the parties had stipulated to an acceptable
process, however, no opinion was offered as to what protections would
be constitutionally required.
Nevertheless, constitutional standards were soon provided by the
Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly,' 84 a case involving the
suspension of welfare payments. In Goldberg, the petitioner claimed
that termination of her welfare benefits without a prior hearing was a
denial of due process. In analyzing this argument, -the Court hastily
dismissed the relevance of categorizing public assistance as a privilege
rather than a constitutional right. The majority noted instead that
"[s]uch benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons quali-
fied to receive them. Their termination involves state action that ad-
judicates important rights."'1 5 The Court then determined that the ex-
tent of the safeguards needed to satisfy due process would be measured
by balancing the individual's interest in avoiding "grievous loss" against
the government's competing desire for summary adjudication. 18& It
was also observed that this process requires an identification of "the
precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the
private interest" concerned. 8 7  Looking at the facts, therefore, the
130 Cal. App. 2d 883, 279 P.2d 215 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. L.A. County 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 969 (1956); Chicago Housing Auth. v. Blackman, 4 fI1. 2d 319, 122
N.E.2d 522 (1954); Kutcher v. Housing Auth., 20 NJ. 181, 119 A.2d 1 (1955); Law-
son v. Housing Auth., 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605 (1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882
(1955).
181. E.g., McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970), affd, 438 F.2d
781 (1st Cir. 1971) (freedom of speech and association); Holt v. Richmond Redevelop-
ment & Housing Auth., 266 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Va. 1966) (same).
182. 301 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. La. 1969).
183. Id. at 253; accord, Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing Auth., 29 App. Div. 2d 338,
288 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1968), afd mem., 27 NY.S.2d 675, 262 N.E.2d 211, 314 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1970). The Ruffin court reached its decision by analogizing from Dixon v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961), which
held that a hearing must be provided to students threatened with expulsion from a state
college. Dixon essentially turned the right-privilege doctrine inside out by concluding
that "[t]he state cannot condition the granting of even a privilege upon the renunciation
of the constitutional right to procedural due process." Id. at 156 (citations omitted).
184. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
185. Id. at 262. In an accompanying footnote, the Court observed that "[ilt may
be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity.'
Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights that do not fall
within the traditional common-law concepts of property." Id. at 262 n.8.
186. Id. at 262-63.
187. Id. at 263, quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
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Court recognized both that qualified recipients rely on welfare pay-
ments to obtain the necessities of life and that the government itself
has an interest in providing continued support to persons eligible to re-
ceive it. These concerns were found clearly to outweigh any counter-
vailing desire to reduce administrative burdens and expense. The
Court concluded that the stakes were too high to afford the petitioner
only the statutory post-termination hearing and held that she had a right
to be heard prior to the suspension of her benefits. While Goldberg
did not require that welfare recipients be given a judicial or quasi-judi-
cial trial, it did specify the elements necessary to satisfy due process guar-
antees. Those elements included timely notice of, and reasons for,
proposed action which affects the individual; -the individual's right to
present his position orally and to cross-examine witnesses before an im-
partial decisionmaker; the right to be represented by counsel; and the
right to a decision which is based solely on the evidence presented at
the hearing, and which states the facts and reasoning relied upon.1
8
Decisions following Goldberg have analyzed the treatment of
claims for procedural due process into a three-part test. First, the in-
dividual seeking relief must demonstrate that he has been threatened
by sufficient state or federal action to invoke the protection of the Four-
teenth or Fifth Amendment.8 9 Second, the individual's threatened in-
terest must be classified as either a property or a liberty interest so as
to fall within the scope of the due process clause.' 90 Third, the private
interest must be weighed against competing government needs to deter-
mine the scope of the procedural protection required. 19'
The safeguards enumerated by the Court in Goldberg were
quickly made applicable to the conventional public housing program by
Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority'9 2 and Caulder v. Dur-
ham Housing Authority.193 However, the use of privately owned dwell-
ings (and the concomitant need for private participation), the mixture
of assisted and nonassisted families, and the peculiarities of assistance
payments contracts serve to distinguish section 8 from the traditional
low-rent housing program. These distinctions will affect a tenant's
188. 397 U.S. at 266-71.
189. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974); Geneva Towers
Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483, 487-88 (9th Cir. 1974);
Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1238-39 (4th Cir. 1973).
190. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-72 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
191. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-90 (1972); Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401-06 (1971); Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage In-
vestors, .504 F.2d 483, 491-93 (9th Cir. 1974). But see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
192. 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970).
193. 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971).
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claim to an adversary hearing if they bear significantly upon any aspect
of the three-part Goldberg test.
Government Participation in Eviction from Assisted Housing
The constraints of due process, as provided in the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments, do not restrict purely private behavior but apply
only to conduct involving the federal or state government. 194 It is
clear, however, that the eviction of assisted families from existing hous-
ing does entail direct state participation. Section 8 provides that ten-
ancies in existing units may be terminated only by an LHA or equiv-
alent housing agency.'95 By definition, these agencies are public in
nature, 96 and their activities have been universally held subject to
Fourteenth Amendment standards. 197
State action is less readily discerned in the new construction and
rehabilitation programs, at least where local agencies are not involved
as developers or administrators of annual contributions. The Supreme
Court has never defined the precise point at which state participation
in otherwise private activity falls within reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment; instead it has measured the significance of indirect gov-
ernment support by "sifting facts and weighing circumstances"' 98 from
one case to the next. The Court's recent decision in Jackson v. Metro-
politan Edison Co.9 9 demonstrates that some type of fact and circum-
stance may have only minor constitutional relevance. In Jackson, the
petitioner claimed that a heavily regulated, private utility company had
disconnected her electrical service in a manner which violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee. The Court affirmed
dismissal of her suit on the grounds that the state was not meaningfully
associated with the actual termination of power. Although the state
public utilities commission had both subjected Metropolitan Edison 'to
extensive regulation and granted it monopoly status, these facts were
not considered adequate in themselves to link the state to all of the
194. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 169 (1970) (Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952) (Fifth Amendment).
195. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(d) (1) (B) (Supp. 1975).
196. Id. § 1437a(6). See notes 22, 23 supra.
197. E.g., Burr v. New Rochelle Mun. Housing Auth., 479 F.2d 1165, 1167 (2d Cir.
1973); Ruffin v. Housing Auth., 301 F. Supp. 251, 254 (E.D. La. 1969); Vinson v.
Greenburgh Housing Auth., 29 App. Div. 2d 338, 340-41, 288 N.Y.S.2d 159, 163
(1968); Williams v. White Plains Housing Auth., 62 Misc. 2d 613, 617, 309 N.Y.S.2d
454, 458-59 (Sup. Ct., Westchester County 1970).
198. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). For an illus-
tration of the difficulties which arise when a state government's involvement with the
challenged activity is only indirect, compare Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966),
with Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
199. 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974).
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company's activities. Rather, the Court adopted a much narrower fo-
cus on the government's regulatory position, declaring the relevant test
to be "whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State
and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of
the latter may fairly be treated as that of the State itself. ' 200  This
nexus could not be established, it was held, because the public utilities
commission did not authorize Metropolitan Edison's termination proce-
dure specifically, but merely failed to overturn the policy when it accep-
ted the corporation's general tariff.2 10
Under Jackson, it would be difficult to argue that a local govern-
ment (and thereby the state) is connected with -the eviction of assisted
families simply because it has approved section 8 proposals in accord-
ance with its own housing assistance plan.20 2 At most, these plans en-
able public officials to exercise some control over the type and distribu-
tion of low-rent units within their communities. As the plans are not
intended to regulate aspects of housing management, they cannot pro-
vide the requisite nexus between local government and the challenged
private conduct, namely. the termination of tenancies. Nevertheless,
there are some circumstances in which evictions from new or reha-
bilitated section 8 units can be attributed to the state. Where, for exam-
ple, a community activity promotes the development of assisted housing
as a part of its urban renewal program, the courts have generally held
that efforts to evict tenants from the subsequently constructed low-rent
units are "infused" with state action.203 Unlike Jackson, which con-
cerned a wholly regulatory connection between the state and Metro-
200. Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 455. The majority drew a distinction between mere approval and af-
firmative endorsement by regulatory agencies: "The nature of governmental regulation
of private utilities is such that a utility may frequently be required by the state regulatory
scheme to obtain approval of practices a business regulated in less detail would be free
to institute without any approval from a regulatory body. Approval by a state utility
commission of such a request from a regulated utility, where the commission has not
put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it, does not transmute
a practice initiated by the utility and approved by the commission into 'state action."'
Id. But see Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
202. Prior to Jackson, such an argument might have had some validity, at least
where it could be shown that the approval did actually come from the local government
and not from HUD. See Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1973), where
the court found state action in an eviction from subsidized housing on the grounds that
the landlord was receiving rent supplement payments, for which local approval was re-
quired.
203. E.g. Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937, 942 (2d Cir.
1974); McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122, 1128 (D. Mass. 1970), aff'd, 438 F.2d
781 (1st Cir. 1971); cf. Male v. Crossroads Associates, 469 F.2d 616, 620-22 (2d Cir.
1972) (denial of admission); Colon v. Tomkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp.
134, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (same).
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politan Edison, the urban renewal projects exemplify instances where
the government and the private owners are in a symbiotic relationship:
the public agency offers the owners a variety of financial benefits (such
as reduced site costs and property taxes), while the owners fulfill a gov-
ernmental objective by providing low income units in a prescribed area
or number. Through the use of economic inducements, the state has
"elected to place [its] power, property, and privilege behind the land-
lords' authority over the tenants, and [has] insinuated [itself] into a
position of interdependence with the landlords."204  An eviction in
such circumstances is, therefore, imbued with the public support nec-
essary to require constitutional review.
Whatever the relationship of the state to the operation of assisted
housing, there can be no doubt that the federal government is deeply
involved with the new program at every level. Section 8 units will be
constructed or renovated only because HUD has agreed -to make assist-
ance payments; and while the incentives for private participation might
not be so great as under the old leasing approach, section 8 developers
will nonetheless receive significant federal contributions. In their turn,
participating lessors will promote congressional objectives by increasing
the supply of "decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of low
income . ... "201 The landlord's role as an agent for the government
is made clearer by the fact that HUD has issued extensive regulations
on the location, maintenance, and management of assisted projects.20
Obviously, HUD and participating owners stand in the same type of
symbiotic relationship as do the state and participating owners in urban
renewal situations. Since the standards for determining federal action
are the same as those used to identify state conduct, 207 the Fifth
Amendment should be applicable to eviction of tenants from assisted
housing.
Property Interest: Tenant's Entitlement to Continued
Occupancy of Assisted Housing
The presence of government participation does not, of itself, mean
that procedural safeguards must be afforded to every person whom the
challenged activity might adversely affect. Procedural due process is
required only when liberty or property interests are at stake.208  Thus,
204. McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122, 1128 (D. Mass. 1970).
205. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437 (Supp. 1975).
206. E.g., 24 C.F.R. § 1273.103(j), 39 Fed. Reg. 45173 (1974) (new construction)
(site and neighborhood standards); id. § 1273.218, 39 Fed. Reg. 45180 (1974) (new
construction) (project operation); id. pt. 1275, app. II, §§ 1.4-.6, 40 Fed. Reg. 3748-
49 (1975) (existing housing) (maintenance and management).
207. E.g., Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d
483, 487 (9th Cir. 1974).
208. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). It should be noted,
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a section 8 tenant will have a right to be heard on the issue of his evic-
tion only if he can show that in some way he is entitled to the continued
occupancy of an assisted unit.
2 9
The essential criteria for such an interest have been outlined by
the Supreme Court in the companion cases of Board of Regents v.
Roth2 10 and Perry v. Sindermann.11 Both suits were initiated by state
college professors, who sought administrative hearings to contest the
nonrenewal of their teaching contracts. In Roth, the Court stated that
while a professor might have great personal concern for his employ-
ment status, the decision to provide procedural safeguards, whatever
their scope, depends not upon the weight of his threatened interest,
but upon its nature. 12 In defining the requisite attributes of a property
interest, the Court said that an individual's "unilateral expectation" of
benefits was not sufficient; rather, entitlements "are created and their
dimensions defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law . . .. "I" The facts in Roth
showed, however, that the petitioner lacked tenure and that the refusal
to rehire came after the expiration of his first one-year contract. Be-
cause the school did nothing to suggest it would renew the agreement,
the Court held that the petitioner had no legitimate claim to reemploy-
ment, and so could not demand a hearing on his termination.
In Sindermann, on the other hand, the expectation of contract re-
newal apparently did have an objective basis. The professor there had
been rehired by his college for ten successive years. Moreover, he al-
leged that the school, while having no formal tenure system, had adop-
ted the policy of rehiring faculty members for as long as they performed
their teaching assignments satisfactorily. The Court decided that if this
allegation could be proven at trial, the teacher should be afforded a
hearing. In so ruling, it observed that the asserted school practices dis-
played an "unwritten 'common law' . . . that certain employees shall
have the equivalent of tenure." ' 4 Thus, while various "rules or under-
however, that even in cases where no property or liberty interest is clearly demonstrable,
an adversary hearing may be required if the state's action could impinge upon freedom
of speech or freedom of the press. Id. at 575 n.14 & cases there cited. See Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). In such an instance, the hearing would be lim-
ited to protection of First Amendment rights.
209. An assisted renter, much less any tenant, cannot assert that he has a constitu-
tional right to remain in his housing, for the Supreme Court has expressly stated that
no such right exists. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
210. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
211. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
212. 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
213. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The Court cited Goldberg as exemplifying a situa-
tion where individuals could rely upon a statutory scheme for the support of their claims.
214. 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972).
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standings" must exist to support what would otherwise be "a mere sub-
jective 'expectancy,' "215 Sindernann demonstrates that the necessary
corroboration need not be explicit but may be implied from customary
administrative procedures.21
Since Goldberg v. Kelly, the courts have more or less assumed that
renters of conventional public housing do have a property interest in
their tenancies.11 7  The question of entitlement has been discussed in
greater detail, however, where occupants of privately owned subsidized
housing have sought hearings prior to their eviction. In the leading
case of Joy v. Daniels,2"" for example, the lessor of a government as-
sisted apartment complex chose not to renew the plaintiff's lease and,
without suggesting any grounds for his decision, gave her notice to va-
cate. The Fourth Circuit sustained the tenant's claim that she had been
denied due process of law and held that families in subsidized housing
could not be evicted without good cause .2 9  This result was based on
an examination of several statutes and regulations, and of standard
management practices in assisted developments. The court first stated
that the congressional goal of "a decent home and suitable living envir-
onment for every American family"2 should encompass not only ade-
215. Id. at 603.
216. Accord, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972); Geneva Towers Ten-
ants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483, 489 (9th Cir. 1974); cf.
Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See generally Due Process
in Subsidized Housing, supra note 101, at 890-91.
217. Caulder v. Durham Housing Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1003 (4th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971); Housing & Redev. Auth. v. Cox (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct.
1, 1974), summarized in 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. If 19,926; Fuller v. Urstadt, 28 N.Y.2d
315, 270 N.E.2d 321, 321 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1971); Johnson v. White Plains Urban Re-
newal Agency, 65 Misc. 2d 293, 294-95, 317 N.Y.S.2d 899, 901 (Sup. Ct., Westchester
County 1971); Williams v. White Plains Housing Auth., 62 Misc. 2d 613, 617, 309
N.Y.S.2d 454, 458-59 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 35 App. Div. 2d 965, 317 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1970);
see Escalera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 853 (1970). While the Escalera decision appeared simply to presume that eli-
gible families were entitled to continued occupancy of low rent units, this assumption
was expressly endorsed in Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937, 943
(2d Cir. 1974).
Public housing tenants are also entitled to procedural due process with regard to
the imposition of fines and additional rent charges. Escalera v. New York City Housing
Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1970); Braxton v. Poughkeepsie Housing Auth.,
382 F. Supp. 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Scarborough v. Elmira Housing Auth. (Sup. Ct.,
Chemung County, N.Y. July 24, 1974), summarized in 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 19,819.
Families in low-rent projects similarly have a right to be heard on the matter of
rental increases. Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (right based
on statutory interpretation); Burr v. New Rochelle Mun. Housing Auth., 479 F.2d 1165
(2d Cir. 1973).
218. 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973).
219. Id. at 1241.
220. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
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quate physical surroundings but also "an atmosphere of stability, secur-
ity, neighborliness and social justice."22' Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,222 which forbids racial or ethnic discrimination in federal
programs, and HUD rules applicable to subsidized projects were also
cited as expressing a policy that assisted tenants should not be treated
in an arbitrary fashion. Finally, the opinion noted that, as a practical
matter, eligible families were allowed to remain in low-rent housing in-
definitely and that evictions, when they did occur, were usually
prompted by more than the mere expiration of a lease. In light of such
factors, the court concluded that occupants of subsidized apartments do
have a property interest in their tenancies.223
Section 8 renters should be viewed as having a similar entitlement
to their housing. Since these renters must fulfill certain statutory con-
ditions to obtain assistance in the first place, they might well expect
that, having done so, they will not be denied the government benefits
without good cause. Such an expectation is more than just "unilateral."
For one thing, section 8, like the subsidy programs, must be adminis-
tered in compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
HUD's new regulations likewise declare that owners may not subject
their tenants to arbitrary or discriminatory practices.224 Moreover, un-
der the reasoning adopted in Joy, the stated goal of section 8-to aid
"lower-income families in obtaining a decent place to live" 225-- itself
implies that housing assistance will be provided in a manner which pro-
motes the broader concepts of stability and social justice. It is appar-
221. 479 F.2d at 1240, quoting McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (D.
Mass. 1970). See also Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937, 943
(2d Cir. 1974).
222. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-4 (1970).
223. 479 F.2d at 1241; accord, Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d
937, 943 (2d Cir. 1974); Anderson v. Denny, 365 F. Supp. 1254 (W.D. Va. 1973); Mc-
Queen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970), ajf'd, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.
1971); Bonner v. Park Lake Housing Dev. Fund Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 325, 333 N.Y.S.2d
277 (Sup. Ct., Nassau County 1972); cf. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc. v. Zaragoza,
43 App. Div. 2d 551, 349 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1973).
Several courts have also held that tenants in federally subsidized, low-income devel-
opments are entitled to rents which are as low as is economically feasible. E.g., Geneva
Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974)
(constitutional due process); Marshall v. Lynn, 497 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3248 (U.S. Oct. 29, 1974) (statutory interpretation); cf. Tenants'
Council v. Lynn, 497 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3248 (U.S.
Oct. 29, 1974) (tenants in federally supported middle-income housing not entitled to
low rents where government aid is directed only toward promoting urban redevelop-
ment). But cf. Paulsen v. Coachlight Apartments Co., 507 F.2d 401 (6th Cir. 1974)
(tenants' right to participate in rental increase process based on HUD regulations); Har-
lib v. Lynn, No. 73-2079 (7th Cir. Feb. 12, 1975) (same), summarized in 2 CCH Pov.
L. REP. 20,485.
224. See text accompanying notes 166, 174 supra.
225. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(a) (Supp. 1975).
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ent, therefore, that sufficient "rules and understandings" exist to
demonstrate that section 8 lessees have a property interest in the con-
tinued occupancy of assisted units.
226
Unlike both the subsidy and conventional public housing ap-
proaches, however, section 8 does enable landlords to withdraw from
the program with relative ease; an owner can disengage himself, in
whole or in part, by simply refusing to renew one or more of his assist-
ance payments contracts. 227  Because low-income tenants will com-
monly be unable to pay the full market rent, the practical consequence
of such a withdrawal is their eviction. Thus to the extent that landlords
may freely discontinue their participation, section 8 families will have
a more limited entitlement, and consequently less security, than they
would in other housing programs.
One can argue, however, that while deference must be given a
private lessor's decision to withdraw, the lessor should not be permitted
to achieve by indirect methods that which he cannot accomplish
directly. If an owner may not evict on the mere expiration of a lease,
neither should he be allowed to use the expiration of a contract solely
as a means of ejecting, without cause, an unwanted low-income lessee.
Such a maneuver, if condoned, would totally undermine the tenant's
substantive right to protection from capricious landlord behavior. As-
sisted renters should, therefore, be provided some opportunity to show
that an owner's reasons for his seeming "withdrawal" are disingenuous.
If the tenants can prove their allegations, the landlord should not be
permitted to terminate their leases without good cause.
Such an argument is legally tenable only where state or federal
action may be attributed to the owner's conduct after an assistance
agreement has expired. This involvement may be demonstrable if the
owner has withdrawn from the program only partially; by virtue of his
continuing participation, the landlord remains a government actor for
the purposes of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. 22 8 A second ob-
stacle concerns the difficulty of proving that the lessor has acted in bad
faith. Not only must a tenant cope with the problem of establishing
a person's motives, but he must also contend with an understandable
226. Since none of the statutory or regulatory policies concerning the operation of
the new program are directed toward nonassisted tenants living in § 8 projects, it would
appear that these renters have no entitlement to continued occupancy and may be evicted
in accordance with applicable state law. Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972); Tenants' Council v. Lynn, 497 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 43
U.S.L.W. 3248 (U.S. Oct. 29, 1974).
227. See note 114 supra.
228. Continuing state involvement might also be established where the develop-
ment in question was constructed with the assistance of special, low-interest state
financing or where construction was induced and management policies defined by a
local urban redevelopment agency. See text accompanying notes 203-04 supra.
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reluctance on the part of HUD and the courts to impose upon owners
the very conditions which they have sought to avoid. Thus, even if
low-income renters can challenge the basis of a lessor's decision to
withdraw, they will likely be protected from arbitrary eviction only in
those circumstances where the landlord's behavior is patently and ex-
clusively fraudulent.
Extent of Procedural Safeguards: Balancing the Interests
of the Tenant and the Government
Where government action and an entitlement to continued oc-
cupancy are shown, efforts to evict an assisted tenant must be accom-
panied by at least some procedural safeguards. The actual extent of
the protection required is determined by balancing the individual's
stake in avoiding "grievous loss" against the government's competing
preference for summary adjudication.22 9 In contrast to entitlement is-
sues, therefore, the degree to which due process safeguards are applic-
able is determined primarily by the relative weights of the parties' op-
posing concerns. This balancing test is not entirely quantitative, how-
ever. The ultimate procedure will also be affected by an evaluation
of whether particular safeguards-such as the rights to present and to
cross-examine witnesses-contribute to a fair disposition of the conflict
presented.30
That the tenant has a considerable interest in preventing an arb-
itrary eviction can scarcely be doubted. It is quite plain that the loss
of assisted housing imposes severe financial hardships upon the family
concerned. Additionally, an evicted renter is deprived of friends, fam-
iliar surroundings, and, where -the dispersal aspect of the leasing pro-
gram has worked, the advantages of residing in a stable middle-class
community. Thus, the tenant who is unfairly dispossessed "suffers not
only in purse, but in spirit, in companionship, and in his sense of the
justice of our society."'23 ' The lessee's desire for equitable treatment
229. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970); see, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134, 171 (1974) (White, J., concurring); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
480-84 (1972); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401-06 (1971); Cafeteria & Restau-
rant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895-96 (1961).
230. Compare Escalera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 862-64
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970), and Williams v. White Plains Housing
Auth., 62 Misc. 2d 613, 618-20, 309 N.Y.S.2d 454, 460-61 (Sup. Ct., Westchester
County), aff'd, 35 App. Div. 2d 965, 317 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1970), with Burr v. New Ro-
chelle Mun. Housing Auth., 479 F.2d 1165, 1168-69 (2d Cir. 1973), and Bloodworth
v. Oxford Village Townhouses, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 709, 717-18 (N.D. Ga. 1974). See
also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1971).
231. McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (D. Mass. 1970), aff'd, 438 F.2d
781 (1st Cir. 1971). An eviction on the ground of nondesirability can, moreover, stig-
matize the tenant and thereby hinder, if not prevent, his readmission into public housing
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is, moreover, buttressed by complementary governmental policies.
Public housing programs seek to promote the nation's general welfare
by enabling citizens to escape the destructive environment of the slum
and to obtain shelter under conditions which permit the development
of socially productive lifestyles. The arbitrary eviction of assisted fam-
ilies does nothing but subvert these objectives.
A tenant can best be protected from the wrongful termination of
his lease by an evidentiary hearing at which he or his representative
may interrogate the landlord and other adverse witnesses in the pres-
ence of an impartial decisionmaker. This trial-type procedure is gen-
erally required by due process where conflicts have arisen as to the ex-
istence of "adjudicative" facts-that is, facts which concern the activ-
ities, intentions, and status of the parties, and about which they are
particularly knowledgeable.232 In such cases, adversary hearings contri-
bute toward a just resolution of claims by enabling the contestants to
explain relevant evidence in their testimony and to expose falsehoods
or misunderstandings through the process of cross-examination. The
use of such a procedure to resolve disputed evictions from low-rent
housing is clearly appropriate, because the requisite proof of good
cause typically involves factual issues upon which the parties and their
witnesses can shed the greatest possible light.
Were the government's interest in summary adjudication sup-
ported by nothing more than a desire to minimize administrative ex-
pense and delay, there could be little question but that the tenant's
strong stake in a trial-type hearing would prevail. Indeed, Caulder and
Escalera have so held with regard to evictions from traditional public
housing.233 Unlike the conventional low-rent program, however, sec-
tion 8 depends mainly upon the private sector for the production and
management of assisted units. Arguably, the prospect of a burden-
at a later date. In Roth, the Court suggested that such an injury to reputation was itself
sufficient to warrant an adversary hearing. 408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972).
232. See generally DAvis, supra note 175, §§ 7.01-.06. Adjudicative facts are, in
short, those which commonly go to a jury. They are contrasted with "legislative" facts
which are those general facts relied upon in the formation of administrative or judicial
policy. Where legislative facts are in dispute, a trial-type hearing is not required because
the contestants are usually in no position to contribute any relevant evidence beyond
that already possessed or more easily obtained, by the agency concerned. In "adjudica-
tory" contexts however, fact finding depends significantly upon the presentation of first-
hand knowledge; the witnesses' demeanor and credibility assume critical importance,
and, in that respect, confrontation and cross-examination are indispensible. Id. § 7.05.
233. Both decisions indicated, however, that the tenants' interest in contesting evic-
tions at a full evidentiary hearing could be overcome by the authority's demonstration
of a compelling state interest in summary procedures. Caulder v. Durham Housing
Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1004 n.3 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971); Es-
calera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 861 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 853 (1970).
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some eviction procedure could discourage the involvement of a great
many landlords and, in so doing, could weaken the program's chances
for success. This possibility is a matter of governmental concern 34 and
should therefore be acknowledged in determining the means by which
contested evictions should be resolved.
An acceptable balance of the tenant's and government's compet-
ing interests can be most easily struck with regard to evictions from
assisted existing units. In such circumstances, -the LHAs retain ulti-
mate control over lease terminations and, under the current rules, are
required to review the sufficiency of each notice to vacate. Since these
agencies have also had to comply with HUD's Grievance Procedure235
in the operation of their own low-rent projects, they should be well-
equipped to provide trial-type hearings where evictions from leased
units are contested. Not only are the local authorities adequately ex-
perienced to conduct these proceedings fairly and efficiently, but they
should also be able to schedule them with sufficient promptness to
eliminate any delay beyond that presently necessitated by HUD's regu-
lations.
The LHA's provision of an adversary termination hearing would,
it is true, impose upon the participating landlord two burdens not en-
countered in the current regulatory procedure. First, the owner would
now be required to appear personally before both the tenant and the
hearing official in order to defend his actions. This obligation is, nev-
ertheless, a mere inconvenience and cannot realistically be given such
weight as to defeat the lessee's interest in being permitted to confront
his accuser. 23 6  A second, more troublesome difficulty arises, however,
in cases where good cause can be proven only by the testimony of in-
dividuals who, perhaps from a fear of reprisals, refuse to state their
complaints in public. As a rule, anonymous accusations should have
234. See generally Due Process in Subsidized Housing, supra, note 99, at 893, 906-
07; Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1246 (1st Cir. 1970). In Hahn, tenants of
subsidized housing were denied the right to an adversary hearing as a means of challeng-
ing rental increases partly because the court thought such a procedure would "kill the
goose in [its] solicitude for the eggs." Although subsequent decisions have afforded ten-
ants a limited right to be heard on the issue of rental increases, courts still appear to
give some weight to the possibility that extensive procedural safeguards may deter pri-
vate participation. See Keller v. Kate Maremount Foundation, 365 F. Supp. 798, 804
(N.D. Cal. 1972), aft'd sub nom., Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage
Investors, 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974). Just how much weight is, or should be given
to such considerations is not entirely clear.
235. See notes 2, 55 supra.
236. The inconvenience of personally appearing could be reduced to a minimum if
the LHAs had sufficient resources to permit their holding hearings at the apartment
complex itself. Such an arrangement would not only be convenient to the landlord and
tenant but would also be likely to facilitate the presentation of witnesses and relevant
evidence (e.g., damage to the premises).
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no part in an eviction proceeding;2 37 nevertheless, it is conceivable that,
in rare instances, the landlord should be permitted to support his decis-
ion to evict without exposing the identities of his witnesses to the other
party.
2 38
As has been previously mentioned, the local authority's statutory
control over lease terminations does not extend to new or rehabilitated
section 8 developments. The responsibility for evicting assisted fam-
ilies from such housing has instead been given to its owners. At first
glance, therefore, it might seem appropriate that these owners should
themselves conduct evidentiary hearings at which tenants could defend
their interests. The obvious problem with this approach is that the
owner, as well as many of his employees, is far too interested in the
outcome of the termination process to be an impartial decisionmaker.
239
On the other hand, development of a procedure which does ensure a
fair disposition is likely to surpass the lessor's financial and administra-
tive capacities.
Another alternative is to employ the states' eviction proceedings
in a manner which affords the assisted tenant a full review of the facts.
This course has been chosen in several of the cases which have dealt
with evictions from privately owned subsidized housing.240 Because
the federal courts have held that, in such developments, renters may
237. "Anonymous informations ought not to be received in any sort of prosecution.
It is introducing a very dangerous precedent, and is quite foreign to the spirit of our
age." Letter of Emperor Trajan to Pliny the Younger, circa 100 A.D., quoted in Carl-
son v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 552 n.7 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). See also Joint
Anti-Fascist Refuge Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); DAvis, supra note 175, § 7.05.
238. For example, a hearing official might justifiably accept testimony without re-
vealing the witnesses' identities if such exposure would clearly damage tenant relations
and yet contribute nothing to the defense of the renter threatened with eviction. Due
Process in Subsidized Housing, supra note 99, at 906-07. See also Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 487 (1972). The exercise of such discretion may be necessary in § 8
developments where disclosure would critically undermine the objective of maintaining
an economically and racially integrated resident population. Nevertheless, the identities
of witnesses should be concealed only in the most compelling circumstances.
239. Due Process in Subsidized Housing, supra note 99, at 908. Compare, however,
Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937, 943-44 (2d Cir. 1974), which
holds that a manager of one subsidized development could adjudicate eviction disputes
involving a second subsidized development, even though both projects were operated by
the same company.
240. Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1242-43 (4th Cir. 1973); Anderson v. Denny,
365 F. Supp. 1254, 1260-62 (W.D. Va. 1973); McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122,
1131 (D. Mass. 1970), affd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971); cf. Hous-
ing & Redev. Auth. v. Cox, (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 1, 1974), summarized in 2 CCH
Pov. L. REP. 19,926; Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc. v. Zaragoza, 68 Misc. 2d 103,
326 N.Y.S.2d 665 (New York City Civ. Ct. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 43 App. Div.
2d 551, 349 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1973).
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not be dispossessed without a showing of good cause, state tribunals
must "broaden" their summary procedures to provide the constitution-
ally required hearing. Such an adaptation of state eviction proceedings
is clearly beneficial to the landlord, since it permits him to satisfy at
once the mandates of both state law and procedural due process. This
alternative does have its drawbacks, however. For one thing, a local
judiciary unfamiliar with the requirement of good cause may, tempor-
arily at least, have difficulty in developing appropriate doctrines.
2 4 1
More importantly, for those persons who cannot (or are unaware that
they can) obtain free legal services, the cost of defending against an
eviction may be prohibitive.242
A third method of handling evictions from new and rehabilitated
section 8 developments would be to adopt an administrative hearing
procedure similar to the one discussed in relation to existing units. Un-
der such an approach, the governmental agencies administering the as-
sistance payments contracts could act as impartial arbiters of disputed
lease terminations. Local authorities are, of course, quite familiar with
this role and could suitably resolve conflicts relating to any new or ren-
ovated dwellings on which they had agreed to make assistance pay-
ments. HUD could fulfill a similar function with regard to the remain-
ing new and rehabilitated section 8 units.
This alternative is clearly the most beneficial to tenants because
it affords them an inexpensive and relatively informal means of obtain-
ing a trial-type hearing. On the other hand, administrative review does
impose an added burden on the developer. To evict a low-income
family, the developer not only may have to file an action in state court
but also is now required to participate in an agency hearing. Neverthe-
less, this apparent inconvenience can actually work to the landlord's ad-
vantage. If, for example, the owner receives a favorable ruling from
the administrative decisionmaker, the tenant, perhaps realizing that his
241. Due Process in Subsidized Housing, supra note 99, at 909.
242. Provision of an evidentiary hearing only within a state's eviction proceeding
may put tenants to an unenviable choice when a dispute arises concerning the payment
of late rental fees or fines for building damage. If the tenant chooses not to pay, he
risks possible eviction. In conventional public housing cases, the courts have held that,
if tenants are to be evicted for nonpayment of additional charges, due process requires
that they be permitted to challenge the assessment of fees through an administrative pro-
cedure. Escalera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 863-64 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970); Braxton v. Poughkeepsie Housing Auth., 382 F. Supp. 992
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Scarborough v. Elmira Housing Auth. (Sup. CL, Chemung County,
N.Y. July 24, 1974), summarized in 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. V 19,819. The same due proc-
ess safeguards should apply in the case of § 8 families. Note, however, that the courts
seem divided as to what administrative procedure is required. Compare Escalera v. New
York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d at 863, with Braxton v. Poughkeepsie Housing
Auth., Civil No. 73-4077 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1974) (order), summarized in 2 CCH Pov.
L. REP. % 20,061.
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case is a weak one, may decide to vacate voluntarily. The converse
could also apply, with the landlord deciding to abandon his claim for
possession. In either case, however, the administrative proceeding en-
ables the owner to avoid costly litigation. Thus it seems unlikely that
the inconvenience posed by an agency hearing would itself be so great
as to significantly deter landlord participation.
One objection which could be made against agency hearings is that
such procedures contravene the statutory right of an owner of new or
rehabilitated units to terminate tenancies.243 However, neither the
scope of procedural safeguards adopted, nor the forum in which a hear-
ing is held, directly impinges upon a party's substantive rights. In the
present instance, administrative review would merely ensure that a
landlord could not exercise his powers in derogation of the tenant's en-
titlement to continued occupancy.
The use of an administrative hearing procedure appears, therefore,
to be an acceptable means of resolving disputed evictions from new or
rehabilitated assisted units. Nevertheless, courts are not likely to re-
quire that such an approach be adopted. On the basis of the subsidized
housing decisions, it seems more probable that tenants will be granted
their right to be heard only through the states' eviction proceedings.
244
243. See text accompanying note 141 supra.
244. Federal courts have rejected the necessity of a prior administrative hearing for
tenants faced with eviction from subsidized housing: the opportunity to raise a good
cause defense in a state court instead has been held to satisfy due process. Joy v. Dan-
iels, 474 F.2d 1236, 1242-43 (4th Cir. 1973); Anderson v. Denny, 365 F. Supp. 1254,
1260-62 (W.D. Va. 1973); McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122, 1131 (D. Mass.
1970), aff'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971). See also DAVIs, supra
note 175, § 7.11.
This issue has not been directly raised in relation to federally supported public hous-
ing because HUD's Model Grievance Procedure has been viewed as requiring an agency
hearing. See note 55 supra. In cases arising before the implementation of the Griev-
ance Procedure, the question was either only indirectly presented or the courts appar-
ently did not consider that the good cause requirement could be applied in state proceed-
ings. See Caulder v. Durham Housing Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1001-02 (4th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971) (administrative hearing because state law did not
require good cause); Johnson v. Tamsberg, 430 F.2d 1125, 1127 (4th Cir. 1970) (ad-
ministrative hearing not required where state court had provided full review); Escalera
v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 865-66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 853 (1970) (administrative hearing required because state law limited review of
of authority action to abuse of discretion); Johnson v. White Plains Urban Renewal
Agency, 65 Misc. 2d 293, 295, 317 N.Y.S.2d 899, 901-02 (Sup. Ct., Westchester County
1971) (urban renewal agency not required to provide eviction hearing but could use
summary proceeding to establish good cause); Williams v. White Plains Housing Auth.,
62 Misc. 2d 613, 618-20, 309 N.Y.S.2d 454, 460-61 (Sup. Ct., Westchester County),
afr'd, 35 App. Div. 2d 965, 317 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1970) (administrative hearing required).
The constitutional significance of administrative hearings in the case of evictions
from public housing will probably be dealt with in the near future because HUD's Pro-
posed Grievance Procedure, supra note 2, does not require an LHA hearing where lease
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As has been mentioned, this result would provide little relief to tenants
(and to some landlords) who cannot easily afford the expense of litiga-
tion.
Admissions
As the federal government's primary low-rent housing program,
section 8 will bear a major responsibility for achieving the congressional
goal "of a decent home and suitable living environment for every Am-
erican family .... ,"4' The new program can meet this objective
only if its benefits are available to the truly destitute. In that regard,
the effectiveness of section 8 will depend greatly upon its eligibility and
selection procedures. Unfortunately, the revised leasing approach in-
corporates admission provisions which, in practice, create a potential
for discrimination against the poor that did not exist under section 23.
Admission Procedures Under Section 23
Admission to section 23 leased housing was, if only in statutory
terms, a two-step process: the determination of eligibility and the sel-
ection of actual occupants. As to the first step, applicants were required
to fulfill not only congressional standards but also an LHA's own criteria
of social desirablity.246 If found acceptable by the local authority, fam-
ilies would be notified of their eligibility and then placed on a waiting
list in accordance with the LHA's admission regulations.241
To protect applicants, both HUD and Congress imposed a variety
of procedural safeguards on eligibilty determinations. As has been
mentioned, HUD instructed local authorities to exclude only persons
who would be likely to interfere with the rights of other tenants.2 8 So
that a family would have notice of the treatment its application should
be given, LHAs were also required to publish their admission cri-
teria.240 HUD further provided that LHAs were to demand of appli-
cants only the data essential for eligibility decisions and were to rely
upon the applicants themselves as the primary source of the needed
informationY.2 °  The authorities' procedures for verifying statements
termination is based on a failure to pay rent or service charges and where the local
courts provide a trial on the merits.
245. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
246. See text accompanying notes 50-55 supra.
247. See text accompanying notes 39-42 supra.
248. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
249. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URAN DEVELOPMENT, Low-RENT HousING IN-
COME LiMnTs, RENTS, AND OCCUPANCY HANDBOOK, A HUD HANDBOOK RHM 7465.1,
at 4 (June 1969).
250. U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Development, HUD Circular 12-17-68, quoted
in 1 HOUSING LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ch. IV, pt. V. at 12-13.
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made in applications had to be posted publicly as well.251 Lastly, Con-
gress required that applicants be informed of their status, and if found
unacceptable, that they be allowed to contest the denial at an informal
hearing with an official of the local authority.
2 52
Section 23 gave participating owners the power to select their ten-
ants, but in practice most landlords waived this right, primarily because
local authorities typically undertook all management and many main-
tenance responsibilities for the units involved in the low-rent pro-
gram.253 Because that arrangement relieved the private lessor of his
usual burdens and yet assured him of continued rent and upkeep, he
had little concern for the actual occupant's identity. Moreover, where
owners did express a fear that the appearance of low-income renters
might induce his other tenants to leave, LHAs sometimes promised to
lease the subsequent vacancies.2" 4 Conversely, there were disincent-
ives to a landlord's selecting occupants himself: in such cases, the local
authority could withhold rental payments whenever a unit remained vac-
ant or could terminate the lease if the lessor rejected a specified num-
ber of referrals from the LHA 55 Thus, it is hardly surprising that
most owners permitted the LHA to select the tenants under its own
policies.
Admissions Procedures Under Section 8
Under the revised leased housing program, acceptance of families
into new or rehabilitated units will be supervised entirely by the parti-
cipating owners.258 While these lessors are subject to some regulatory
control, s5 7 they have, in general, been afforded considerable leeway to
develop their own admissions process. An owner must, of course, ap-
ply statutory criteria in determining an applicant's eligibility258 and, on
the whole, must allow every family which requests assisted housing to
obtain and submit a standardized application.259 The HUD rules do
provide, however, that a private landlord may refuse to accept such
applications whenever he has no vacancies and his "waiting list is such
251. See note 250 supra. See also U.S. DEn'T OF HousiNG & UaBAN DEVELOP-
m-Tr, Low-Rmqr HousING INcoME LIMIs, RENTS, AND OccuPANcY HANDBOOK, A
HUD HANDBooK, RHM 7465.1, at 6-7 (June 1969).
252. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
253. See note 82 supra.
254. Oakland Leased Housing Program, supra note 77, at 543.
255. SEcToN 23 HANDBOOK, supra note 68, ch. 3 § 2, at 3; Oakland Leased Housing
Program, supra note 77, at 543 (three rejections permitted).
256. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(e)(2) (Supp. 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 1273.218(b)(1), 39
Fed. Reg. 45180 (1974).
257. See id. § 1273.218(a), 39 Fed. Reg. 45180.
258. See text accompanying notes 130-33 supra.
259. 24 C.F.R. § 1273.218(b) (2), 39 Fed. Reg. 45180 (1974).
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that there would be an unreasonable length of time before the applicant
could be admitted. '260  HUD does not indicate what might be "an un-
reasonable length of time," nor does it require the owner to offer ap-
plicants any proof that each of his units is in fact occupied. When,
on the other hand, a lessor does receive a satisfactory application, he
must, if he has an opening, execute a lease with the family con-
cerned; 261 if his housing is filled, he must place that family on a waiting
list.262  Beyond requiring that the applicants be statutorily eligible,
however, HUD's rules do not suggest what criteria an owner should ap-
ply in his selection of "acceptable" tenants. Unlike section 23, there-
fore, the new program offers families no practical assurance that ad-
missions will be made on the basis of uniform and public standards.
HUD also fails to impose any restrictions on the manner by which fam-
ilies are ranked in an owner's waiting list, and does not require the pri-
vate lessor to inform applicants of their positions on these lists or of how
long they may have to wait for the next opening to appear.263  Finally,
and perhaps most significantly, the regulations omit any reference to
rejected applicants; consequently, such families are left with neither a
statutory nor a regulatory right to receive notice of the grounds for their
denial or to discuss the matter with the landlord.264
Where existing housing is concerned, section 8 divides admissions,
as did the old program, into two procedures. Local authorities will re-
main in charge of eligibility determinations, which, with the exception
of the modified income standard,265 should be made in much the same
manner as before. HUD regulations do introduce one new element
into this process, however, by stating that qualified applicants shall re-
ceive certificates of family eligibility.266 In essence, these certificates
260. Id.
261. Id. § 1273.218(b) (4), 39 Fed. Reg. 45180 (1974).
262. Id. § 1273.218(b)(3), 39 Fed. Reg. 45180 (1974).
263. The procedure differs when the owner is a public housing agency. In such
cases, HUD requires the agency to inform families on its waiting list of the approximate
date on which a suitable unit will be available "insofar as such date can be reasonably
determined." Id. § 1273.218(b) (6), 39 Fed. Reg. 45180 (1974).
264. Compare the procedure to be followed by an owner which is a public housing
agency. If the agency decides that an applicant is statutorily ineligible or is not to be
admitted "for other reasons," it must send him a letter notifying him of, and explaining
the reasons for, his rejection, as well as informing him of his right to request an informal
hearing. "If, after conducting such an informal hearing, the [agency] determines that
the applicant shall not be admitted, the [agency] shall so notify the applicant in writing
and . . . inform [him] that he has the right to request a review by HUD of the [agen-
cy's] determination." Id. This note will focus, however, on the admission process as
administered by private owners.
265. See text accompanying notes 130-33 supra.
266. 24 C.F.R. § 1275.102(c), 40 Fed. Reg. 3735 (1975); id. pt. 1275, app. III,
40 Fed. Reg. 3750 (1975).
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merely entitle their holders to rental assistance if acceptable dwellings
can be found within a sixty day period.267
The new statute provides, in terms identical to those of its pred-
ecessor, that owners may select the families which are to occupy their
assisted units. In contrast to former practices, however, it is unlikely
that section 8 landlords will surrender their right to choose. This dif-
ference is primarily the result of a change in the methods ,to be used
in obtaining private involvement with the leasing program. Under sec-
tion 23, LHAs were almost wholly responsible for attracting owners
and soliciting their participation. 68 HUD has specified, however, that
such duties will henceforth be assumed by the applicants themselves,
269
who, armed with their certificates of eligibility, are expected to locate
suitable housing and arrange for tenancy on their own20 The method
demands that owners who are contacted by eligible families make their
own ad hoc selection: they either accept the particular applicant's re-
quest for housing or they reject it.
Thus, regardless of the type of housing involved, tenant selections
in the new program will be made almost exclusively by the participating
owners. This situation creates a potential for discriminatory practices
and, unfortunately, the revised leasing approach provides two incent-
ives for such activity. As has been noted, management and mainten-
ance functions have been transferred by section 8 and accompanying
regulations from the LHA to the private landlord.2  The landlord will
now bear the risks of rent defaults and damage to his assisted dwell-
ings. It is therefore logical that he should evaluate each applicant with
267. Id. § 1275.207(f) (1), 40 Fed. Reg. 3741 (1975). If the family fails to locate
a unit within the 60 days, it may apply for an extension of its certificate. Id. §
1275.207(f) (3), 40 Fed. Reg. 3741 (1975). It should be noted that an LIA's failure
to renew the certificate can arguably be treated as a deprivation of a property interest
that should also be accompanied by procedural safeguards on the tenant's behalf.
268. See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
269. 24 C.F.R. § 1275.103(a), 40 Fed. Reg. 3736 (1975). The local authority is,
however, still expected to publicize the need for units and to solicit owner participation
through advertising and cooperation with local real estate brokers and civic organiza-
tions. Id. § 1275.207(b), 40 Fed. Reg. 3741 (1975). Compare note 73 supra. The
LHA is also required to brief certificate holders on their civil rights and on how to lo-
cate suitable housing. 24 C.F.R. § 1275.207(e), 40 Fed. Reg. 3741 (1975).
270. As it appeared in HUD's § 23 regulations, the finders-keepers approach was
justified on the grounds that it would "maximize choice," and, by implication, encourage
a broader geographic dispersal of low-income and minority households. See 24 C.F.R.
§ 1274.103(a), 39 Fed. Reg. 17188 (1974). The language concerning maximization of
choice does not appear in the equivalent provision of the § 8 rules. 24 C.F.R. §
1275.103 (a), 40 Fed. Reg. 3736 (1975). See note 278 infra.
271. 24 C.F.R. § 1273.103(u), 39 Fed. Reg. 45174 (1974); id. pt. 1273, app. H1,
8H 1.7a, 1.9, 39 Fed. Reg. 45188-89 (1974) (new construction); id. § 1275.103(q), 40
Fed. Reg. 3739 (1975); id. pt. 1275 app. 1I, § 1.4a, 40 Fed. Reg. 3748 (existing hous-
ing). See also note 141 supra.
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these risks clearly in mind and that he should be inclined to exclude
any family which seems to him a likely source of potential problems.
In that regard, it is not hard to imagine that households with the lowest
incomes will be disfavored. Landlords may believe that such house-
holds will be afflicted with more social problems than relatively more
prosperous applicants, and that, consequently, these families will have
greater difficulty in paying, or less desire to pay, their rental contribu-
tions on a timely and regular basis. Secondly, owners of assisted hous-
ing will also recognize that many of their units, probably the majority
of them,2 72 will be occupied by middle-class residents paying the
full market rate. As a result, lessors will have a strong financial in-
terest in selecting only those lower-income households which they be-
lieve will not disturb or offend neighboring "market renters." This
concern may well be strongest among developers of new or rehabili-
tated housing because they cannot rely upon the continued presence
of long-term occupants, as can the owners of already existing units.
Both considerations-management duties and tenant relations-will
discourage the acceptance of eligible households which show any sign
of social undesirability, be it in the form of an unstable family or em-
ployment situation, a history of illegitimate births or "immoral" behav-
ior, some type of criminal record, or perhaps even past or continuing
psychiatric treatment. Any departure from the social norm, whatever
the owner may consider that norm to be, will doubtless be compounded
in its significance when the applicant is also a member of a racial or
ethnic minority.2'7
Landlords of new or rehabilitated developments are in an excel-
lent position to discriminate against the "problem poor" because they
have been given control over the entire admissions process. Since
many applicants will learn of the assistance program only through the
developer or his advertisements, they may well be ignorant of their
rights, thus allowing the owner to reject them on whatever grounds he
chooses to express. Furthermore, the likelihood that eligible families
272. See notes 124-25 & accompanying text supra.
273. The incidence of racial prejudice in the rental housing market is an undisputed
fact. Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Housing (MCFH), a nonprofit organization lo-
cated in the southern San Francisco Peninsula, has conducted a series of audits of apart-
ment developments and obtained results which demonstrate the strength of discrimina-
tion in suburban America. Using pairs of individuals who resembled one another in
all respects other than race, MCFH was able to calculate the number of landlords who
appeared to discriminate in a given community by comparing the responses they gave
to the white individuals concerning vacancies and rental terms with those given to their
black counterparts. These audits, completed between 1970 and 1972, showed that be-
tween 40-60% of the apartment complexes in any one of six communities surveyed were
apparently managed on a discriminatory basis. Detailed results of the studies are avail-
able from Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Housing, 457 Kingsley Ave., Palo Alto, Cal.
94301.
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will far outnumber the assisted units available permits lessors to be
highly selective in accepting tenants. Admittedly, section 8 does spec-
ify that at least half the assisted units must be filled by "very low-in-
come' families.17 4  However, the statutory definition of "very low-in-
come"-50 percent of the local median-does not necessarily describe
the truly poor; depending upon the community involved, a substantial
portion of households qualifying as "very low-income" may be signifi-
cantly above the poverty level.17 5  Owners can select these households
in order to comply with the statute and still avoid admitting destitute
families in extreme need of adequate shelter.
Perhaps the greatest difficulties, however, will be encountered by
eligible households searching for existing apartments in the private
market generally. Given the nation's shortage of moderately priced
housing, vacancy rates for units within the range of HUD's fair market
rent figures are likely to be low. Requiring applicants to find suitable
openings by themselves will prove burdensome to those whose employ-
ment leaves them little time for apartment hunting or whose mobility
is restricted by personal disabilities or lack of adequate transportation.
More importantly, even when acceptable vacancies are located, families
will have to notify owners that theirs will be no ordinary tenancy: ap-
plicants must explain the elements of the assistance program and per-
suade the owner to participate. This task will naturally require some
salesmanship on the applicant's part and will disadvantage those with
a poor command of English. Furthermore, landlords can use the sec-
tion 8 program itself in an effort to exclude families illegally: owners
may deny housing to blacks ostensibly because they do not wish to in-
volve themselves with the assistance arrangement, while their real mo-
tive for rejection is a purely racial one. Thus, although the finders-
keepers policy is intended to promote free choice, it could in practice
merely reinforce existing patterns of racial and economic segrega-
tion.2
76
274. See text accompanying note 133 supra.
275. See note 39 supra.
276. Many minority applicants will, no doubt, themselves be inclined to seek out
assisted units chiefly within the familiar surroundings of their own racial communities.
HUD's regulations may, in fact, have given such inclinations a financial boost as well.
The § 8 rules provide that "[a]s an incentive to Families to find the most economical
housing suitable to their needs," HUD will reduce a family's monthly contribution in
proportion to the amount by which the applicable fair market rent exceeds the actual
rent which the family has negotiated for its unit. 24 C.F.R. § 1275.103(n), 40 Fed.
Reg. 3738 (1975). This "shopping incentive," as HUD calls it, could encourage- low-
income families to obtain the cheapest possible housing so as to permit them more easily
to purchase other essential commodities. Such a result may, from a broad perspective,
be wholly salutary. Nevertheless, it does contravene the congressional goal of "promot-
ing economically mixed housing." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(a) (Supp. 1975). Further-
more, inducing applicants to lease inexpensive units may result in their acquiring poorly
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HUD's regulations for section 8 do, however, provide some poten-
tial for restricting the abuses and inequities outlined above. In their
proposals for funding, developers of new or rehabilitated housing must
include information demonstrating management capability 277 and in-
dicating that the construction site is not located in a racially impacted
neighborhood or in the vicinity of adverse environmental influences
specified by HUD.17 8  Proposals must also contain an assurance that
the owner will comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Title VIII of the Civil Rights of 1968, and Executive Order 11063, all
of which require, in varying terms, racial equality in government sup-
ported housing.27 9 Where projects are planned for five or more units,
as they most probably will be, developers must additionally submit an
affirmative fair housing marketing plan, which, in accordance with sep-
arate HUD rules, states the methods to be used in recruiting minorities
for occupancy of the assisted units.2
0
HUD regulations further provide that, regardless of size, all new
and rehabilitated section 8 developments must be "managed and oper-
ated without regard to race, color, creed, religion, sex or national orig-
in. '' 21 This policy is restated somewhat more broadly in the housing
assistance payments contracts, which also contain the following lan-
guage:
No person shall be automatically excluded from participation in,
or be denied the benefits of, the Housing Assistance Payments Pro-
gram because of membership in a class such as unmarried mothers,
recipients of public assistance, etc. 282
maintained apartments which, in a short time, will deteriorate to a substandard condi-
tion.
277. 24 C.F.R. § 1273.209(a)(10), 39 Fed. Reg. 45177-78 (1974). See also id.
§ 1273.215(g), 39 Fed. Reg. 45179 (1974).
278. Id. §§ 1273.103(j)(3), (5), 39 Fed. Reg. 45173 (1974); id. § 1273.205(a),
39 Fed. Reg. 45175 (1974). Note that while the regulations for the § 8 existing housing
program also contain certain environmental requirements, they fail to provide restric-
tions against the use of housing in racially impacted neighborhoods. See id. § 1275.103
(g) (11), 40 Fed. Reg. 3737 (1975).
279. Id. § 1273.209(a) (7), 39 Fed. Reg. 45177 (1974).
280. Id. See the Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing Regulations, 24 C.F.R. §
200.600-.640 (1974); U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Development, HUD CIRCULAR
No. 800.4, app. 2 (Feb. 25, 1972). An acceptable affirmative fair housing marketing
plan must include provisions for advertising through minority media and for training
employees in the implementation of fair housing laws. Developers are also required to
provisionally display fair housing posters at the project site.
Note that local authorities in the existing housing program must also submit an
equivalent "equal housing opportunity plan" in their proposals for funding. 24 C.F.R.
§ 1275.204(e), 40 Fed. Reg. 3740 (1975).
281. 24 C.F.R. § 1273.218(a), 39 Fed. Reg. 45180 (1974).
282. Id. pt. 1273, app. II, § 2.1a, 39 Fed. Reg. 45189 (1974); id. pt. 1275, app.
II, § 2.1a, 40 Fed. Reg. 3749 (1975).
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This restriction could offer significant protection to low-income appli-
cants if there were corresponding regulations dealing with its enforce-
ment on an individual basis. HUD does state that owners must coop-
erate in compliance reviews and complaint investigations pursuant to
civil rights laws.183 While this requirement indicates that applicants sus-
pecting racial, religious or sexual discrimination might be able to seek
administrative relief, it is unclear whether "complaint investigations" will
be made for other types of discriminatory behavior. There is, more-
over, an ambiguity as to when the quoted provision first becomes bind-
ing upon the participant lessor. The provision appears nowhere in the
HUD regulations themselves, but is set forth only in the assistance pay-
ments contract. Since this document is not to be executed until
after the initial marketing of the assisted units, 2 4 an owner could, in
the absence of other legal restraints, reject many of his earliest ap-
plicants on grounds which would violate the contract had it been al-
ready signed.2 r However, before they start construction, section 8 de-
velopers are also required to enter into a preliminary agreement with
HUD. One section of this agreement states that:
Each party has read or is presumed to have read the proposed
[housing assistance payments] Contract. It is expressly agreed
that there shall be no change in the terms and conditions of the
Contract other than [those relating to the period of construction (or
rehabilitation) and time of HUD's project inspection]. 2 0
This language clearly demonstrates that the parties intend that a con-
tract be executed after construction is satisfactorily completed.
287
Thus, even if one assumes that an owner might legally withdraw from
the program before entering an assistance contract, it is reasonable to
argue that where owners do proceed to market their units as section
8 housing, they have hnpliedly consented to the terms of the assistance
contracts, and so should be bound thereby.
A private lessor of existing dwellings, however, is in no way ob-
ligated to comply with HUD's restrictions until he actually does enter
into an assistance contract. As a result, eligible families have no ad-
283. Id. pt. 1273, app. H, § 2.3, 39 Fed. Reg. 45190 (1974). A similar provision
is contained in housing assistance payments contracts to be signed by owners of existing
units. Id. pt. 1275, app. II, § 2.2, 40 Fed. Reg. 3749 (1975).
284. Id. § 1273.217(a), 39 Fed. Reg. 45180 (1974); see id. § 1273.215(f), 39 Fed.
Reg. 45179 (1974).
285. However, if the owner fails, during the initial marketing of his units, to lease
any unit planned for assistance, he cannot receive temporary payments on the vacancy
if he has rejected any eligible applicant without good cause. Id. § 1273.103 (e) (2), 39
Fed. Reg. 45171 (1974). See also text accompanying notes 290-93 infra.
286. 24 C.F.R. pt. 1273, app. I, § 1.5e, 39 Fed. Reg. 45183 (1974).
287. Note also id. § 1.1c, 39 Fed. Reg. 45182 (1974) (housing assistance payments
contract included in preliminary agreement as exhibit).
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ministrative protection against discriminatory practices in the general
housing market. To alleviate this problem, the HUD rules state that
local authorities
may provide assistance in finding units for those Families who, be-
cause of age, handicap, or other reasons, are unable to locate ap-
provable units and shall provide such assistance where the Family
alleges -that discrimination is preventing it from finding a suitable
unit .... 288
HUD does not specify what is included in the term "discrimination,"
but one could fairly contend that it should be read to encompass all
forms of social prejudice and not just those expressly prohibited by pos-
itive law. The extent of assistance to be given families which have
suffered discrimination, and whether other applicants (such as the
handicapped) may expect any aid at all, will depend mainly on the
amount of funds which LHAs can devote to their administrative duties.
Unfortunately, this amount is expected to be small, as HUD desires to
restrict sharply the use of annual contributions for operating ex-
penses.28 9
It would appear, however, that HUD and the LHAs can exercise
substantial control over selections to be made by owners who are at-
tempting to fill a vacancy in a presently assisted unit. The regulations
provide that, whatever the type of housing concerned, the agency
which administers the assistance contract may terminate its share of
rental payments if the landlord rejects any eligible applicant without
good cause.2 90 HUD does not state what would qualify as a good cause
denial, but it is clear that automatic rejections of welfare applicants
would not suffice; by implication, a denial based solely on a family's
income, or lack thereof, would also seem impermissible. Unfortun-
ately, this method of supervising an owner's selection policies must con-
tend with two practical problems. First, with regard to newly construc-
ted or rehabilitated housing, HUD may find it difficult to determine
whether owners have indeed unfairly rejected eligible families. Sec-
ond, in the case of existing units, termination of assistance payments
may not prove to be an effective deterrent to a participant lessor's
arbitrary exclusion of qualified applicants. Unlike developers of new
or rehabilitated section 8 units, the owners of existing apartments may
have little stake in the assistance program: their participation might,
for example, be limited to but one or two units. For these owners,
it may be more desirable to withdraw from section 8 than to accept
what they feel could be a troublesome tenant.
288. Id. § 1275.103(a), 40 Fed. Reg. 3736 (1975) (emphasis added).
289. Bums Interview, supra note 79.
290. 24 C.F.R. §§ 1273.103(e)(2)-(3), 39 Fed. Reg. 45171-72 (1974) (new con-
struction); id. § 1275.103(c)(2)(ii), 40 Fed. Reg. 3736 (1975) (existing housing).
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In conclusion, it appears that the potential for discrimination
against the indigent is regulated inadequately for three reasons. First,
neither the HUD regulations nor the assistance payments contract
clearly state that applicants may be rejected only for good cause; that
is, where the facts demonstrate that he would be likely to damage the
premises or materially interfere with the rights of other tenants. To
be sure, the assistance contract forbids certain automatic exclusions, but
it would seem that since section 8 must be responsive to the needs of
the very poor, a more comprehensive prohibition would be advisable,
More troublesome is -the fact that, under the finders-keepers system,
eligible families are wholly bereft of administrative safeguards against
discrimination by nonparticipating landlords.
Second, HUD has provided applicants with the means to detect
only some forms of prejudice. While families are alerted to the illegal-
ity of racial discrimination in certificates of eligibility and through the
required display of fair housing posters in newly constructed develop-
ments,291 there is no equivalent assurance that applicants will be in-
formed that a participating landlord may not reject them solely because
they receive welfare payments or are unwed mothers.219 Nor does
HUD require section 8 lessors to develop and publish any uniform pol-
icy on selections. While it is difficult for even the well-informed to
recognize instances of discrimination, families will be entirely helpless
without some knowledge of -their rights. Third, where an eligible
household does discover that it has been denied housing on a discrimin-
atory basis, HUD has not clearly set forth any administrative channels
through which relief may be quickly and inexpensively obtained. 293
291. The posters are necessary to an acceptable affirmative fair housing marketing
plan. See note 280 infra.
292. Admittedly, holders of eligibility certificates in the finders-keepers program
will receive copies of the assistance contract (which does prohibit the wholesale exclu-
sion of welfare recipients and unwed mothers), and should be informed of its provisions
in the briefings provided by the local authority. See note 269 supra. In this instance,
however, such information may serve only to heighten an applicant's frustration since,
in his search for housing, he is not likely to encounter many lessors who have signed,
and therefore are bound to comply with the assistance contracts.
293. It is true that Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-
19 (1969), as amended (Supp. 1975), ensures that racial minorities can, in most in-
stances, obtain HUD's assistance in mediating complaints involving an alleged discrimi-
natory denial of rental housing. Where informal conciliation fails to produce results,
the aggrieved family can sue for relief in the courts. Many state laws provide similar
protection. See, e.g., CAL. HFALTH & S. CODE §§ 3570041 (West 1973 & Supp. 1975).
CAL. HFALTH & S. CODE §§ 35700-45 (West 1973). Nevertheless, enforcement of these
laws demands resort to the courts, which not only involves some expense but consider-
able delay as well. Unless an applicant succeeds in obtaining a temporary restraining
order, the assisted unit from which he was excluded will likely be rented by the time
of trial. Furthermore, nonminority applicants are unable to invoke whatever remedies
Title VIII can afford, and, in most States, will find that local law provides no convenient
relief for arbitrary denials of housing.
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HUD is empowered to promulgate rules satisfying most, if not all,
of the problems faced by indigent families who seek admission to as-
sisted units. It is unlikely that HUD will take any remedial action,
however, because that would involve limiting an owner's discretion and
could thus deter the private sector from cooperating in the new pro-
gram. As with evictions, therefore, rejected applicants will probably
be forced to seek relief initially from the courts.
Due Process Requirements in Admission Procedures
In the conventional public housing program, a family which has
been declared unacceptable must be both informed of the basis for its
rejection and allowed to contest the denial at an informal hearing.
2 94
An applicant in the section 8 program should be treated no worse.
Moreover, if a conference with the participating landlord fails to per-
suade the applicant that he has been fairly treated, he should be per-
mitted to present his objections before an impartial decisionmaker;
where the existence of certain facts is disputed, he should also be en-
titled to cross-examine the owner and inspect his records.
As a constitutional matter, these procedural safeguards will be re-
quired only if a section 8 applicant can successfully meet each aspect
of the three-part Goldberg test: he must identify the presence of fed-
eral or state action in his denial; he must establish a property interest
in admission to the assisted housing program; and he must demonstrate
an interest in being afforded an evidentiary hearing that is sufficiently
strong to outweigh competing governmental concerns.
2 95
Government Participation in Rejection of Applicants
for Assisted Housing
There should be little difficulty in establishing federal involvement
with the rejection of applicants by developers of new or rehabilitated
section 8 housing. HUD is, of course, directly associated with these
developers through the preliminary agreements discussed above, 296 and
through housing assistance payments contracts. Both documents carry
the government's pledge to provide financial contributions in return for
the owner's satisfactory performance of management duties, among
which are included the marketing of units and the admission of fam-
ilies.297  As with evictions, therefore, HUD and the developers are
symbiotically related; and, as an administrator of federal housing bene-
294. 42U.S.C. § 1410(g)(4) (1970).
295. See text accompanying notes 188-91 supra.
296. See text accompanying notes 286-87 supra.
297. 24 C.F.R. pt. 1273, app. I, § 1.3b, 39 Fed. Reg. 45182 (1974); id. app. II,
1.9, 39 Fed. Reg. 45188-89 (1974).
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fits, the participating owner should be subject to the Fifth Amendment's
due process clause.
With regard to existing housing, landlords who have already
signed assistance contracts with LHAs should similarly be required to
select eligible tenants in a manner consistent with Fourteenth Amend-
ment limitations. In such cases, state action clearly exists on the basis
of a local authority's direct financial support of the owner's manage-
ment practices. A wholly different situation appears, however, where
the lessor's only link with the section 8 program arises when he is re-
quested to provide housing for a family in search of units through the
finders-keepers method. In these circumstances, the local authority's
participation extends no further than the issuance of a certificate of el-
igibility to the qualified applicant. In the absence of even an informal
contract between the LHA and the owner, the state cannot be impli-
cated in the owner's decision to reject the low-income family, even
though that decision might be entirely capricious. As a result, the ex-
cluded applicant has no grounds upon which to invoke constitutional
due process, but must instead seek relief under statutory law. Such
an outcome is inadequate not merely because only some forms of dis-
crimination are statutorily prohibited, but also because it precludes the
possibility of the applicant's obtaining quick and inexpensive relief
through administrative channels. The unavailability of constitutional
safeguards to families rejected under the finders-keepers approach is
especially regrettable in light of the fact that finders-keepers is in-
tended to be the primary means of obtaining existing units for the sec-
tion 8 program.
Property Interest: Applicant's Entitlement to Admission
to Assisted Housing
Even where the denial of housing does involve governmental
participation, a rejected applicant will have no right to procedural safe-
guards unless he can also demonstrate a property interest in admission
to the section 8 program. Unlike the evictee from a low-rent project,
however, an applicant's interest does not concern the continuation of
benefits presently enjoyed, but involves the prevention of their being
withheld in the first place. Several courts have considered this distinc-
tion between revocation and denial to be significant;2 98 it could there-
298. E.g., United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d
1079, 1086-87 (2d Cir. 1971); Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 407-08 (2d Cir.
1970) (prisoner has no constitutionally protected right to procedural due process at pa-
role release hearing). See also Spady v. Mount Vernon Housing Auth., 41 App. Div.
2d 762, 341 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1973), afrd mem., 34 N.Y.2d 573, 310 N.E.2d 542, 354
N.Y.S.2d 942, cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 243 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Sumpter v.
White Plains Housing Auth., 29 N.Y.2d 420, 328 N.Y.S.2d 649, 278 N.E.2d 892, cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 928 (1972); Velez v. Christian, 75 Misc. 2d 159, 347 N.Y.S.2d 536
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fore pose certain problems to the family which asserts a right to be
heard on the issue of its rejection.
Generally speaking, two reasons may be suggested for distinguish-
ing between admissions and terminations. First, some courts have de-
clared that applicants do not require procedural safeguards because
they have less at stake than individuals who are actually receiving gov-
ernmental assistance; unlike the recipients, who are relying on a contin-
uation of aid, applicants are said to have nothing but a mere anticipa-
tion of benefits.299 Second, it has been argued that while termination
is usually predicated on a specific occurrence-such as a significant
wage increase for a welfare recipient-admission requires a subjective
analysis of the applicant's general suitability for the program concerned,
and thus involves an exercise of discretion incompatible with a claim
of entitlement. 00
Ultimately, these arguments are not very persuasive. The dis-
missal of an applicant's interest as a mere expectancy and, therefore,
as undeserving of protection seems faulty in two respects. For one
thing, the contrast drawn between the applicant's "mere hope" of assist-
ance and the recipient's stake in continued benefits conveys the im-
pression that the latter interest should be given considerably greater
weight. 301 This distinction hardly seems appropriate, however, where
the program concerned is designed to fulfill basic human needs; an ap-
plicant for welfare or housing assistance may be able only to anticipate
receiving governmental aid, but it does not follow that his need of such
benefits is realistically distinguishable from that of the recipient. In
any case, Roth and subsequent Supreme Court decisions have clearly
stated that in determining the existence of an entitlement, it is the nature
of the interest asserted, not its weight, that is dispositive.3 °2  The rele-
vant inquiry is whether independent rules or understandings exist to
support the claimant's anticipation of receiving benefits.30 3 The dis-
tinction between an expectancy and a vested right seems to be flawed
(Sup. Ct., Kings County 1973). In these cases, New York courts held that rejected
applicants to government-assisted housing had no right to a full evidentiary hearing, but
were entitled only to an informal discussion of their denial with LHA officials. It is
not clear, however, whether the specific holdings are based upon a finding that appli-
cants have no property interest in low-rent housing, or whether, as a matter of balancing,
the government's interest in an informal procedure was of greater weight.
299. See Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 408-09 (2d Cir. 1970) (distinction
between denial and revocation of parole); In re Sturm, 11 Cal. 3d 258, 266, 521 P.2d
97, 102, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366 (1974) (same).
300. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 407-08 (2d Cir. 1970).
301. See United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d
1079, 1086-87 (2d Cir. 1971).
302. See text accompanying note 212 supra.
303. See text accompanying note 213 supra.
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additionally, because it is based not upon whether rules are established
to regulate the distribution of aid in one instance and not in another,
but is founded on the immaterial fact that one person has actually re-
ceived assistance while -the other has not.304
As to the issue of discretion, the mere fact that an administrator
may exclude certain individuals from participating in a program does
not necessarily mean that applicants have no property interest in being
admitted. An administrative agency can, it is true, modify or even
eliminate entitlements where it has the discretion to define classes of
beneficiaries or to issue regulations delineating the terms under which
assistance is to be distributed.30 5  On the other hand, where an
agency's discretion is not employed in the sense of rulemaking, but is
exercised only to evaluate an individual's eligibility in light of presently
established criteria, applicants may assert a property interest in ad-
mission to the extent that they qualify under -those independent "rules
and understandings." This point was clearly made in Goldsmith v.
Board of Tax Appeals,8"' a case involving a certified public account-
ant's application to practice before the Board of Tax Appeals. There
the Supreme Court said:
[T]he petitioner having shown . . . that, being a citizen of the
United States and a certified public accountant under the laws of
a state, he was within the class of those entitled to be admitted to
practice under the Board's rules, he should not have been rejected
upon charges of his unfitness without giving him an opportunity by
notice for hearing and answer. The rules adopted by the Board
provide that "the Board may in its discretion deny admission, sus-
pend or disbar any person." But this must be construed to mean
the exercise of a discretion to be exercised after fair investigation,
with such a notice, hearing and opportunity to answer for the ap-
plicant as would constitute due process.
8 07
304. See Barnett v. Lindsay, 319 F. Supp. 610 (D. Utah 1970), which stated that
"the rights surrounding that entitlement Ito welfare benefits] are created when the statu-
torily defined benefit arises and not after the benefits have been dispensed. Conse-
quently, it is at this time that the constitutional protections surrounding those rights must
be first applied." Id. at 612; cf. Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1964)
(denial of liquor license subject to same procedural safeguards as revocation of such li-
censes). See also Note, The Rejected Applicant for General Assistance and His Right
to a Review, 25 HASTINGS LJ. 678 (1974).
305. Even the clearest of statutory entitlements-welfare, for example-is condi-
tional in nature. A recipient's property interest in certain benefits is always subject to
removal by amendment to, or repeal of, the relevant legislation. DAvis, supra note 175,
§ 7.12-1 (Supp. 1970). Nevertheless, the mere fact that the rules creating an entitle-
ment can be changed at the legislature's discretion does not prevent those persons who
qualify under the present standards from having a property interest.
306. 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
307. Id. at 123; accord, Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S.
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Thus, where discretion is limited to an adjudicatory evaluation of facts
in light of existing standards, rather than a legislative creation of those
standards, an applicant should be afforded some degree of procedural
due process.1
0 8
To establish a property interest in admission to the section 8 pro-
gram, therqfore, families must demonstrate the presence of rules and
guidelines concerning not only eligibility but selection as well. The
requisite showing of eligibility is simple enough since the relevant cri-
teria are fully covered by statutes and regulation; 30 9 no discretionary
judgments are involved. Hence, where an applicant is rejected on
grounds of ineligibility, he should be given some chance to prove that
he is, in fact, statutorily qualified.310
Congress has not, however, provided any standards which ex-
pressly concern the owner's selection of eligible tenants. Nevertheless,
there is ample evidence to demonstrate that a participating owner may
not freely reject whomever he pleases. Both HUD's regulations and
the assistance contracts require the landlord to comply with the laws
forbidding racial, sexual, and religious discrimination. 11 More import-
antly, the assistance contracts also provide, as has been mentioned pre-
viously, that owners may not exclude applicants solely "because of
membership in a class such as unmarried mothers [or] recipients of pub-
lic assistance . *... ,31 It would seem, therefore, that on the basis of
96 (1963) (denial of admission to bar must be accompanied by administrative due proc-
ess).
308. As Sindermann indicates, the standards need neither be explicit nor remove
all discretion from the administrative agency. See text accompanying notes 214-16 su-
pra. Support for this proposition is provided in Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Feder-
ated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974), in which tenants were afforded
a right to submit written comments to HUD on the matter of a proposed rental increase
in their subsidized housing development. Looking at the statutes and legislative history
on the subsidy program, the court noted that its purpose was to provide eligible tenants
with housing at as low a rent as was economically feasible. On this basis, the court
held that the plaintiff-lessee's had a property interest in low cost housing, even though
HUD retained substantial discretion to approve the owner's request for the rental in-
crease. See id. at 589-91.
309. See text accompanying notes 130-34 supra.
310. HUD regulations for the § 8 existing housing program do require that local
authorities provide an informal hearing to applicants who have been determined to be
statutorily ineligible. 24 C.F.R. § 1275.207(h), 40 Fed. Reg. 3742 (1975). The same
procedure must also be followed as to both eligibility and selection decisions where
LHAs are themselves the owners of new or rehabilitated § 8 housing. Id. § 1273.218
(b) (6), 39 Fed. Reg. 45180 (1974).
311. Id. § 1273.218(a), 39 Fed. Reg. 45180 (1974); id. app. II, § 2.1a, 39 Fed.
Reg. 45189 (1974) (new construction); id. pt. 1275, app. II, § 2.1a, 40 Fed. Reg. 3749
(1975) (existing housing).
312. Id. pt. 1273, app. HI, § 2.1a, 39 Fed. Reg. 45189 (1974); id. pt. 1275, app.
II, § 2.1a, 40 Fed. Reg. 3749 (1975).
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these statutory and contractual provisions, and in light of the assistance
program's implicit goal of providing an atmosphere of social justice, 8'
families should be entitled at the very least to immunity from arbitrary
landlord rejections.
Precisely what constitutes an arbitrary denial is not made clear by
simply referring to social goals and contractual bans on class exclusions.
A sharper focus on an applicant's property interest in section 8 housing
is provided, however, by Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 1 "
a case in which welfare recipients challenged their nonadmission to a
subsidized development. The district court there held that the owner's
refusal to accept eligible applicants solely because they were on welfare
denied them equal protection of the laws. The opinion noted that the
classification was intolerable because it bore no reasonable relation to
its stated goal of excluding "indifferent tenants, inconsiderate neigh-
bors, [and] uncooperative occupants."3" 5  Nevertheless, the court did
state that recipients of public assistance could be permissibly rejected
if they had poor rent paying records. Presumably, the same would ap-
ply to histories of antisocial behavior.316 Colon also recognized that
subjective analysis of a prospective occupant's qualifications does have
some role in the admissions process:
It is unquestionably beneficial to the apartment project as a whole
if the element of human judgment and discretion is allowed to re-
main . . . in the administration of .[the] tenant selection procedure
so long as that discretion is not permitted to transcend the bound-
aries established by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constita-
tion.31 7
The court suggested, therefore, that an owner's discretion must be ex-
ercised reasonably, and it seems logical to infer that distinctions made
among applicant families solely on the basis of the extent of their in-
come, as well as its source, would not be permissible.
There should be no doubt that Colon is applicable to private land-
lords participating in the section 8 program and that it will furnish a
valuable precedent to families which seek some judicial relief from arb-
itrary denials of assisted housing. Nevertheless, the fact that the case
held that unreasonable classifications were violative of equal protection
contributes nothing to the applicant's interest in obtaining an admin-
istrative review of his rejection. Colon did, however, provide the ex-
313. See McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (D. Mass. 1970), affd, 438
F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971).
314. 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), quoting affidavit of the Director and
Chairman of the Renting Committee.
315. Id. at 138.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 139.
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cluded plaintiffs several important procedural safeguards as well. The
court ordered the subsidized lessor to notify families of the status of
their applications within a reasonable time; to establish a chronological
waiting list, "affording the applicants an opportunity to gauge the
progress of their cases;" and, most importantly, to develop and publish
uniform admissions criteria. 1 " These remedies were prompted by an
earlier public housing case, Holmes v. New York City Housing Author-
ity, 19 which involved similar issues. There the Second Circuit wrote:
[T]he existence of absolute and uncontrolled discretion in an
agency of government vested with the administration of a vast pro-
gram, such as public housing, would be an intolerable invitation to
abuse. ... For this reason alone due process requires that selec-
tions be made in accordance with "ascertainable standards" .. .
and, in cases where many candidates are equally qualified under
these standards, that further selections be made in some reasonable
manner such as "by lot or on the basis of the chronological order
of application. 32 0
Extent of Procedural Safeguards: Balancing the Interests
of the Applicant and the Government
Colon and Holmes suggest that owners participating in the section
8 program have a duty to publish their admission criteria and to notify
families of the status of their applications. These minimal due process
safeguards should enable applicants to recognize whether they have
been rejected on an arbitrary basis; however, further safeguards are
necessary if families are to obtain any practicable remedy for an un-
fair denial. The validity of an applicant's claim for added protection,
such as an evidentiary hearing, will depend upon whether his stake in
admission to the assistance program outweighs the government's con-
cerns for administrative efficiency and for participation by private land-
lords.
In several cases, disappointed applicants for federal or state ad-
ministrative benefits have been unable to obtain Goldberg-type hear-
318. Id.
319. 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
320. Id. at 265, quoting Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964). It is
not clear how specific an owner's selection policy must be. Traditionally, courts have
exercised only minimal scrutiny of the substance of LHA admission policies. See, e.g.,
Davis v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Auth., 311 F. Supp. 795, 797-98 (N.D. Ohio
1970) (LHA's admission regulations not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad). How-
ever, two recent cases suggest that the judiciary may be more willing to demand greater
specificity in such policies so as to provide applicants with better notice of the necessary
qualifications for acceptance. See Tyson v. New York City Housing Auth., 369 F. Supp.
513, 520-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Tucker v. Norwalk Housing Auth., No. B-251 (D. Conn.
May 24, 1971), summarized in 1 CCH Pov. L. REP. 2735.13.
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ings because the courts have not been persuaded that there was suffic-
ient "grievous loss" to warrant the requested safeguards. 2' These de-
cisions seem to have distinguished instances where adversary hearings
have been ordered to precede a termination of benefits on the grounds
that in those circumstances the individual, having grown accustomed
to the benefit, would be sorely afflicted by its abrupt withdrawal; the
applicant's status is said to be different, however, since he loses nothing
if he is not admitted in the first place. 32 2  The New York courts have
apparently adopted this distinction, and in a number of cases dealing
with nonadmission to public housing, have held that disappointed fam-
ilies are only entitled to an informal interview with LHA officials.323
Undeniably, the rejected applicant is not compelled, as is the
evictee, to locate and move into new accommodations. Nor is the ap-
plicant faced with the problems of learning to cope with suddenly and
dramatically increased housing costs-but this is only because the ap-
plicant has always had to contend with such crippling expenditures.
For the most part, the injuries which distinguish the evicted tenant from
the excluded applicant are only transitory in nature. The ultimate
losses are the same for both, Each feels a sense of frustration and
alienation when the benefits for which he is qualified are withheld.
More importantly, each is forced to return to the same substandard and
unsanitary living conditions from which the low-rent housing program
promised a permanent escape. In this respect, perhaps the only differ-
ence between the applicant and the evictee is that the latter had at least
some temporary respite from existence in a slum or ghetto environ-
ment. In any case, whatever distinctions may be drawn between the
evictee and the applicant, it hardly follows that an applicant's interest
in obtaining decent accommodations is unworthy of substantial proced-
321. In re Sturm, 11 Cal. 3d 258, 266, 521 P.2d 97, 102, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366
(1974) (prisoner denied parole not entitled to same procedural safeguards as would be
required in case of parole revocation); Zobriscky v. Los Angeles County, 28 Cal. App.
3d 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1972) (applicant for welfare not entitled to trial-type hear-
ing); Sumpter v. White Plains Housing Auth., 29 N.Y.2d 420, 278 N.E.2d 892, 328
N.Y.S.2d 649, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 928 (1972) (applicant to public housing not enti-
tled to trial-type hearing); see Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 406-07 (1971).
322. See In re Sturm, 11 Cal. 3d 258, 266, 521 P.2d 97, 102, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361,
366 (1974); Sumpter v. White Plains Housing Auth., 29 N.Y.2d 420, 425, 278 N.E.2d
892, 894, 328 N.Y.S.2d 649, 652, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 928 (1972).
323. See Spady v. Mount Vernon Housing Auth., 41 App. Div. 2d 762, 341 N.Y.S.
2d 552 (1973), alf'd, 34 N.Y.2d 573, 310 N.E.2d 542, 354 N.Y.S.2d 942 (mem.), cert.
denied, 95 S. Ct. 243 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Sumpter v. White Plains Housing
Auth., 29 N.Y.2d 420, 328 N.Y.S.2d 649, 278 N.E.2d 892, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 928
(1972); Velez v. Christian, 75 Misc. 2d 159, 347 N.Y.S.2d 536 (Sup. Ct., Kings County,
1973). Note, however, that the decisions do not clearly bifurcate the issues of entitle-
ment and of balancing.
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ural protection. In Davis v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority,
324
one federal district court adopted a better approach and ruled that an
applicant to public housing had a right to a trial-type hearing in which
she could contest her rejection.
It must again be noted, however, that, in contrast to the traditional
public housing program, section 8 cannot function successfully without
the support of private landlords and developers. In fashioning pro-
cedural safeguards for the rejected family, therefore, attention must
also be given to the burdens which various procedures would impose
upon the lessors concerned. One alternative would be to provide the
excluded applicant with a full statement of the reasons for his denial
and an opportunity to discuss his status with the participating owner.
This informal procedure would present only minor inconveniences for
landlords and yet could prove an efficient method of enabling appli-
cants to resolve simple misundertandings or to rebut misleading infor-
mation. Such a hearing would, nonetheless, serve little purpose where
the owner is unwilling to cooperate or has made an arbitrary decision
to reject the family in any event. Consequently, where the applicant
believes that the grounds asserted for its denial have no basis in fact,
and where a conference with the lessor is unproductive, the applicant
should be permitted to present his case before an impartial decision-
maker. As with evictions, either HUD or an LHA, depending upon
which is party to the relevant assistance contract, would be the logical
arbiter.
It may be objected, however, that administrative review will deter
a substantial number of landlords from entering the section 8 program.
This objection can be asserted on two grounds. The first possible claim
is that application hearings will impose the burden of participation on
owners of assisted housing. Admittedly, where an applicant does
charge that an owner has arbitrarily denied him admission, that owner
should appear at the hearing, not only for -the purposes of cross-exam-
ination, but also for the purpose of defending his own position. This
inconvenience, if it is true, might discourage some owners from involv-
ing themselves with section 8. That should not be the government's
only interest, however. As was observed in Goldberg, the government
should also be concerned that those entitled to its largess be able to re-
ceive it.325 Since the intended beneficiaries of the assistance payments
approach are the low-income families in need of adequate shelter, HUD's
interests should be the same as theirs, for if eligible applicants are not
properly treated under section 8, the program will ultimately fail.
324. 311 F. Supp. 795 (N.D. Ohio 1970); accord, Neddo v. Housing Auth., 335
F. Supp. 1397 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
325. See 397 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1970).
Given this added governmental concern on an applicant's behalf, it
would appear that families excluded from section 8 housing should be
afforded a trial-type hearing.
The second claim concerning landlord participation is that, at least
where new and rehabilitated housing is concerned, administrative re-
view is contrary to the statutory language allowing owners to supervise
admission and therefore represents an interference with their discre-
tion.326 As has been mentioned with regard to evictions, however, an
owner's discretion may not be exercised in a manner which impinges
upon the applicants entitlement. To the extent that nonadmission hear-
ings are restricted to determining whether an owner has acted within his
own selection policy, they will not encroach upon his statutory rights.
3 27
A final objection against nonadmission hearings is 'directed to the
governmental interest in minimizing administrative expense. It can be
argued that, unlike evictions, application denials occur extremely fre-
quently; thus, to provide trial-type hearings on such matters would
place an overwhelming administrative burden on the agencies in-
volved.128  Such a result is not inevitable. For one thing, if it is as-
sumed that conferences between participating owners and applicants
are of practical value, it should also be assumed that many disputes can
be settled by those means. Furthermore, the submission of disputes
to HUD or the LHA can, and should, be limited to complaints which
present material issues of fact; applicants who are clearly ineligible un-
der the statutory criteria or an owner's admission policy need not be
afforded a right to be heard.
329
326. This argument cannot be made where an applicant seeks review of an owner's
determination that he is statutorily ineligible since, in making that decision, the owner
exercises no discretion whatsoever. See text accompanying notes 309-10 supra.
327. The scope of review to be exercised at a nonadmission hearing should of
course be limited to whether the landlord has abused his discretion. The latitude of an
owner's discretion will itself depend upon not only the restrictions set forth in the regula-
tions and assistance payments contracts, but also upon the terms of his constitutionally
required selection policy. See text accompanying note 320 supra.
328. The government's concern for avoiding an unmanageable number of nonad-
mission hearings has been considered by some courts to outweigh the applicant's interest
in fall review. Zobriscky v. Los Angeles County, 28 Cal. App. 3d 930, 933, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 121, 123 (1972) (welfare); Sumpter v. White Plains Housing Auth., 29 N.Y.2d
420, 424-25, 278 N.E.2d 892, 893, 328 N.Y.S.2d 649, 651-52, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 928
(1972) (public housing). Contra, Alexander v. Silverman, 356 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D.
Wis. 1973) (welfare).
329. See Alexander v. Silverman, 356 F. Supp. 1179, 1180 (E.D. Wis. 1973), in
which applicants who had been declared ineligible for welfare were granted the right
to be heard at a trial-type hearing. As a means of alleviating administrative burdens,
however, the court further stated that this procedure need not be extended to applicants
who were prima facie ineligible. Id. The case is discussed in Note, The Rejected Appli-
cant for General Assistance and His Right to a Review, 25 HAsNGs LJ. 678, 686
(1974).
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Unfortunately, it is not clear that these hearings, or indeed any
procedural safeguards will actually prove helpful in enabling applicants
to occupy the assisted units they desire. The problem lies in enforcing
a hearing panel's decision when the owner concerned does not wish
to comply. The withholding of assistance payments can be an effective
sanction when applied to newly constructed or rehabilitated develop-
ments, because the developer is financially committed to participation
in the leasing program. Where a landlord of existing housing partici-
pates, however, he may have only a few units involved with section 8;
and if he is adamant in not accepting an applicant, he may simply de-
cide to abandon the program altogether and lease the units on the priv-
ate market. Such an occurrence would of course leave the rejected
applicant exactly where he started.
Conclusion
Unlike the former leased public housing program, section 8 cur-
tails LHA involvement and delegates most of the maintenance and
management of assisted units to participating landlords. To offset the
imposition of these burdens, and thus to enhance the program's attract-
iveness in the housing market, section 8 also permits private owners
to exercise considerable freedom in the selection and eviction of ten-
ants.
The lessor's interest in maintaining a steady income from both as-
sisted and market units, however, creates the potential for discrimin-
ation against families which have apparently "undesirable" lifestyles or
backgrounds. Unfortunately, neither the statutes nor the regulations
provides an adequate means of preventing such arbitrary practices.
Furthermore, where abuses do occur, aggrieved families are afforded
no procedural mechanism for an inexpensive and speedy disposition of
their complaints.
Recent case law demonstrates, however, that section 8 families are
constitutionally entitled to some procedural safeguards. It seems clear
that tenants evicted from assisted housing have a right to present a good
cause defense in state court proceedings. Similarly, rejected applicants
should be able to demand an explanation of the reasons for their rejec-
tion and should be afforded an opportunity to present objections to
HUD or the LHA.
Judicial remedies are not likely to provide low-income families
with complete protection, however. It is by no means clear that the
courts will decide that administrative trial-type hearings are required
for the resolution of termination and admission disputes. Even if these
procedures are found to be constitutionally mandated, landlords may
evade administrative rulings by withdrawing from section 8 at the end
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of their relatively short contract terms. In any case, applicants in the
finders-keepers program can expect no judicial protection whatsoever.
The interests of the low-income tenants and applicants can, there-
fore, be fully protected only by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. HUD has the power to restrain section 8 landlords from
engaging in discriminatory behavior and to ensure that families have
a right to challenge objectionable practices in a convenient and im-
partial forum. HUD has failed, however, to accept its responsibilities
to the poor, contenting itself instead with providing financial assistance
and little more.
The answer to America's shortage of "decent, safe, and sanitary
housing" does, of course, require a massive expenditure of government
funds. Nevertheless, housing is also a "people problem" which can be
solved only through sufficient government participation to ensure that
the interests of private enterprise do not overwhelm the aspirations of
the poor.
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